Data Philanthropy by Lev-Aretz, Yafit
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 70 | Issue 6 Article 3
8-2019
Data Philanthropy
Yafit Lev-Aretz
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Yafit Lev-Aretz, Data Philanthropy, 70 Hastings L.J. 1491 (2019).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol70/iss6/3
I - LEV-ARETZ_12 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019 6:39 PM  
 
[1491] 
Data Philanthropy 
YAFIT LEV-ARETZ† 
The term “data philanthropy” has been used to describe the sharing of private sector data for 
socially beneficial purposes, such as academic research and humanitarian aid. The recent 
controversy over an academic researcher’s alleged misuse of Facebook users’ data on behalf of 
Cambridge Analytica has brought data philanthropy into the spotlight of public debate. Calls for 
data ethics and platform transparency have highlighted the urgent need for standard setting and 
democratic oversight in the use of corporate data for public ends. Data philanthropy has also 
received considerable scholarly attention in various academic disciplines but has, until now, been 
virtually overlooked by the legal literature. This Article explains and starts filling in the resulting 
research gap by providing the first legal accounting of data philanthropy. Following a detailed 
description of current developments and scholarly thinking, this Article homes in on a normative 
assessment of privacy risks that are often cited as a conceptual and practical barrier to data 
philanthropy. 
This Article refines the scope of data philanthropy’s informational risks and proposes a 
framework for mitigating some of these risks through the Fair Information Practice Principles 
(“FIPs”). Specifically, the purpose specification and use limitation principles, which limit data 
collection to ex-ante specified purposes, are discordant with the unanticipated, ex-post quality of 
data philanthropy. Adopting a new “data philanthropy exception” will account for the existence 
and nature of the privacy risks, the time frame for action, the social risks of using the data, and 
the allowed retention time following the reuse. The data philanthropy exception reinforces the 
values at the heart of the FIPs, provides guidance in a field that currently operates in a legal 
vacuum, and introduces the possibility of responsible sharing by and to smaller market 
participants.  
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INTRODUCTION 
April 2015 brought the worst earthquake to hit Nepal in over eighty years, 
killing nearly 9,000 people, injuring over 22,000, and displacing over 2.8 million 
individuals.1 The resulting humanitarian crisis was massive, and it was virtually 
impossible to quickly locate the thousands of people who might have been hurt 
or trapped, or those who had escaped to safe zones.2 But Nepal’s largest mobile 
network operator, Ncell, offered a solution. The company partnered with 
Flowminder, a non-profit organization that builds population movement 
models,3 to map population displacements around the country using anonymized 
data from 12 million Ncell subscribers in the affected areas.4 These data-based 
maps helped humanitarian response organizations to pinpoint the location of 
impacted individuals and to allocate aid resources and response teams 
accordingly.5 
The Ncell-Flowminder collaboration exemplifies a new form of private 
sector donation: using private sector data for the public social good. Data 
generated via platforms like telecom operators, satellite companies, and social 
media networks, has the potential to enable a range of insights into economic 
development, medical advances, environmental issues, and various other 
properties of public life that could accelerate the pace and scope of social 
discovery and development. This understanding has triggered a “data-for-good” 
movement, which promotes data-driven projects that can increase the efficiency 
of social initiatives, extend their reach, and better tailor them to specific 
communities.6 The data-for-good movement has spotlighted the imperative role 
of the private sector in producing useful data for social action, sparking an active 
conversation about models and incentives for sharing. As part of this 
conversation, the term “data philanthropy” was born.7  
The term “data philanthropy” has been used to describe the giving of 
private sector data, providing access to it, or the production of data-driven 
insights for a socially beneficial purpose.8 The recent Facebook/Cambridge 
Analytica debacle, at which political consulting firm Cambridge-Analytica used 
 
 1. Nikhil Kumar, Go Inside the Effort to Rebuild Nepal, TIME (June 25, 2015), 
http://time.com/3928685/nepal-earthquake-recovery-donors-food-rice/.  
 2. Matt Petronzio, Facebook’s New ‘Disaster Maps’ Could Revolutionize Natural Disaster Rescue 
Efforts, MASHABLE (June 7, 2017), https://mashable.com/2017/06/07/facebook-disaster-maps-humanitarian-
aid/#jQ0fXOB95Oqq.  
 3. UN GLOBAL PULSE & GSMA, THE STATE OF MOBILE DATA FOR SOCIAL GOOD REPORT 7 (2017), 
http://unglobalpulse.org/sites/default/files/MobileDataforSocialGoodReport_29June.pdf [hereinafter MOBILE 
DATA FOR SOCIAL GOOD REPORT]. 
 4. Id. 
 5. Id. 
 6. Alberto Alemanno, Big Data for Good: Unlocking Privately-Held Data to the Benefit of the Many, 9 
EUR. J. OF RISK REG. 183, 184 (2018).  
 7. Some of my views on the term philanthropy are articulated in Part II. For more on the criticism of the 
term, see Yafit Lev-Aretz, A Case for Precision: Against the Philanthropy in Data Philanthropy (on file with 
the author) [hereinafter Lev-Aretz, A Case for Precision].  
 8. See supra Part II.  
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information originally obtained for research purposes to target potential voters 
during the 2016 election,9 has highlighted the risks of data philanthropy misuse. 
In 2014, Facebook permitted an academic researcher, Aleksandra Kogan, to 
access the private information of tens of thousands of volunteers who agreed to 
have their data used in an academic study.10 But Kogan then shared all that 
Facebook user data—which included information about all of the volunteers as 
well as information about all their friends and contacts that did not agree to the 
sharing—with Cambridge Analytica.11 The company then used the data from 
Kogan to target consumers and voters on behalf of Cambridge Analytica’s 
customers.12 The story about the unauthorized sharing of personal data from 
nearly 87 million Facebook users broke nearly four years later, in 2018, and 
massive public outcry ensued. The blatant misuse of academic access privileges 
in the Facebook/Cambridge Analytica case has spotlighted the active market for 
sharing corporate data for academic research and the lack of acceptable 
standards for these collaborations.13  
As data philanthropy collaborations have mushroomed in recent years, 
scholars from a range of diverse disciplines, including computer science, social 
science, economics, information science, business, and philosophy, have 
engaged in data philanthropy conversations.14 Many of those scholars—as well 
as industry players and other stakeholders—have identified a pressing need for 
legal guidance on various aspects of the data philanthropy practice, especially 
 
 9. Nicholas Confessore, Cambridge Analytica and Facebook: The Scandal and the Fallout So Far, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 4, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/04/us/politics/cambridge-analytica-scandal-
fallout.html. 
 10. Id. 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. 
 13. See, e.g., Sheera Frenkel, Scholars Have Data on Millions of Facebook Users. Who’s Guarding It?, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/06/technology/facebook-information-data-sets-
academics.html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share. 
 14. See, e.g., Jean Burgess & Axel Bruns, Easy Data, Hard Data: The Politics and Pragmatics of Twitter 
Research after the Computational Turn, in COMPROMISED DATA: FROM SOCIAL MEDIA TO BIG DATA 93 
(Ganaele Langlois et al. eds., 2015); John Karlsrud, Peacekeeping 4.0: Harnessing the Potential of Big Data, 
Social Media, and Cyber-Technology, CYBERSPACE AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS: THEORY, PROSPECTS AND 
CHALLENGES 141 (Jan-Frederik Kremer & Benedikt Müller eds., 2014); Patrick Meier, Human Computation for 
Disaster Response, in HANDBOOK OF HUMAN COMPUTATION 95 (Pietro Michelucci ed., 2013); Luciano Floridi 
& Mariarosaria Taddeo, What Is Data Ethics? 374 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y, Dec. 28, 2016, at 1; 
Jeffrey P. Kahn et al., Opinion: Learning as We Go: Lessons from the Publication of Facebook’s Social-
Computing Research, 38 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 13677 (2014); Robert Kirkpatrick, Big Data for Development, 
1 BIG DATA 3 (2013); Nir Kshetri, The Emerging Role of Big Data in Key Development Issues: Opportunities, 
Challenges, and Concerns, BIG DATA & SOC’Y, DEC. 22, 2014, at 1; Mariarosaria Taddeo, Data Philanthropy 
and the Design of the Infraethics for Information Societies, 374.2083 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y, Dec. 
28, 2016, at 1; Effy Vayena et al., Ethical Challenges of Big Data in Public Health, PLOS COMPUTATIONAL 
BIOLOGY, Feb. 9, 2015, at 1; Robert Kirkpatrick, A New Type of Philanthropy: Donating Data, HAR. BUS. REV. 
(Mar. 21, 2013), https://hbr.org/2013/03/a-new-type-of-philanthropy-don.  
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when the practice implicates individuals’ privacy. Yet, until now, legal scholars 
have been conspicuously missing from this discourse.15  
One likely reason for the relative silence of legal academics and regulators 
alike is that contractual agreements are often sufficient to legally facilitate reuse. 
By broadly defining data collection purposes and granting expensive 
authorizations for use, collectors of personal data have been able to safeguard 
themselves from legal liability for sharing the data for socially beneficial 
purposes.16 Even in regulated industries, businesses that have had an interest in 
data sharing have found a way to incorporate privacy compliance into the 
sharing process.17 Evidence suggests that corporate players who are truly 
interested in donating data for social good have plenty of legal options to do so, 
such that, in practice, the extent to which legal concerns impede data 
philanthropy efforts is overstated.18  
Another reason may be that most calls for guidance have been directed 
towards privacy scholars, asking for a framework for balancing privacy risks 
 
 15. As of writing this, there are only five law review pieces that mention data philanthropy. See Janine S. 
Hiller & Jordan M. Blanke, Smart Cities, Big Data, and the Resilience of Privacy, 68 HASTINGS L.J. 309, 335–
36 (2017) (discussing “the right to be free from government and private surveillance” through transparency and 
the ability to opt out, and argue that “[t]his principle speaks to ‘Data Philanthropy,’ a framework that gives 
individuals the power either to consent to being involved or to opt-out of participation in the smart city”); Luca 
Leone, Addressing Big Data in Eu and US Agriculture: A Legal Focus, 12 EUR. FOOD & FEED L. REV. 507, 508 
(2017) (pointing to “‘open data’ and ‘data philanthropy’ as institutional and procedural patterns to follow to 
achieve more knowledgeable and sustainable agriculture”); Beth Simone Noveck, Rights-Based and Tech-
Driven: Open Data, Freedom of Information, and the Future of Government Transparency, 19 YALE HUM. RTS. 
& DEV. L.J. 1, 15–16 (2017) (referring to data philanthropy as “the next wave in corporate social responsibility” 
and giving some examples for private sector data sharing for socially beneficial purposes); Galit A. Sarfaty, Can 
Big Data Revolutionize International Human Rights Law?, 39 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 73, 97 (2017) (proposing “to 
broaden the scope of big data projects in the human rights field,” by “incentiviz[ing] companies to engage in 
data philanthropy”); Stephanie Segovia, Privacy: An Issue of Priority, 11 HASTINGS BUS. L.J. 193, 200 (2015) 
(arguing that “[l]egislative legal frameworks should be created that (1) protect the individual, and (2) require 
contractors to make their data public, thus honing in on the business value that data philanthropy can deliver,” 
without further reference to or elaboration on the term). None of these works provide a material descriptive or 
normative contribution on data philanthropy initiatives. While Sarfaty’s article discusses data philanthropy in 
more detail than others, even her work does not offer a comprehensive analysis of data philanthropy in the 
context of her proposal.  
 16. Viktor Mayer-Schönberger & Yann Padova, Regime Change? Enabling Big Data through Europe’s 
New Data Protection Regulation, 17 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 315, 322 (2016). For example, Facebook’s 
Data Policy states:  
We provide information and content to vendors and service providers who support our business, such 
as by providing technical infrastructure services, analyzing how our Products are used, providing 
customer service, facilitating payments or conducting surveys. . . . We also provide information and 
content to research partners and academics to conduct research that advances scholarship and 
innovation that support our business or mission, and enhances discovery and innovation on topics of 
general social welfare, technological advancement, public interest, health and well-being.  
Data Policy, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/policy.php (last visited July 27, 2019) (first emphasis 
added).  
 17. FUTURE OF PRIVACY FORUM, UNDERSTANDING CORPORATE DATA SHARING DECISIONS: PRACTICES, 
CHALLENGES, AND OPPORTUNITIES FOR SHARING CORPORATE DATA WITH RESEARCHERS 11 (2017), 
https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/FPF_Data_Sharing_Report_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter FPF REPORT]. 
 18. Id. 
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with the likely social benefits of data philanthropy.19 Among the privacy 
community of legal scholars, however, which has dedicated itself to the vital 
mission of identifying and addressing data-driven privacy harms, discussing the 
socially beneficial aspects of the information economy is a morally challenging 
task. To borrow from Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, this ill-gotten data has 
the appearance of a fruit from a very poisonous tree: how can we launder it, 
portray it as a charitable way of giving, and use the historically loaded and 
probably inaccurate term “philanthropy”?20 Furthermore, to gift, one must first 
own. How can corporations share personal data when their ownership of this 
data is highly contested?21  
These concerns all have merit. Today’s “big data” culture imposes 
numerous negative externalities that are being allocated unfairly.22 But ignoring 
the social benefits of hoarded information may add more to the list of negative 
externalities while simultaneously preventing positive ones. The two scholarly 
endeavors—to limit illegitimate collection and use of personal data and, 
simultaneously, to promote socially beneficial reuses—must coexist without, 
except in extreme cases, influencing each other.23 
This Article is the first to engage in a legal analysis of data philanthropy, 
with a focus on the privacy aspects of the practice. Part II defines key properties 
of data philanthropy and situates this Article within the broader academic 
discourse. This in-depth descriptive contribution provides a close look at the 
interaction between data philanthropy and preexisting laws, social norms, and 
industry practices.  
Part III offers a significant normative contribution by identifying a legal 
research gap, redefining this gap and its roots in the context of privacy, and 
proposing a framework for responsible sharing of private sector data for socially 
beneficial purposes. In Part III, this Article also provides a much-needed legal 
perspective on the privacy risks of data philanthropy. Before doing so, however, 
this Article refines the scope of relevant risks by questioning privacy’s 
restraining power over the practice. In reality, privacy compliance has not 
presented a significant barrier to corporate sharing for social good.24 Most 
businesses can and have sheltered themselves from legal liability through their 
 
 19. While these calls have not identified privacy scholars as such, they require guidance on privacy, which 
could naturally come only from experts in the field.  
 20. See infra Part II. 
 21. See infra Part II. 
 22. See, e.g., Julie Cohen, The Surveillance-Innovation Complex: The Irony of the Participatory Turn, in 
THE PARTICIPATORY CONDITION IN THE DIGITAL AGE 207 (Darin Barney et al. eds., 2015); Danielle Keats Citron 
& Frank Pasquale, The Scored Society: Due Process for Automated Predictions, 89 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2014); 
Frank Pasquale, Privacy, Antitrust, and Power, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1009 (2013); Shoshana Zuboff, Big 
Other: Surveillance Capitalism and the Prospects of an Information Civilization, 30 J. INFO. TECH. 75 (2015). 
 23. This approach is in line with Helen Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity theory that treats privacy 
interests as part of a complex set of interests and considerations. HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: 
TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 129–85 (2010). 
 24. FPF REPORT, supra note 17, at 6.  
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terms of service agreements.25 Furthermore, sharing of corporate data for public 
ends has been mostly done under technical and institutional privacy 
safeguards.26 Instead, this Article argues for the pressing need—particularly 
from non-lawyers—to provide a privacy framework group broader than data-
related issues under the umbrella term “privacy,” and use privacy’s legal 
framework as a proxy for general legal acknowledgment of data philanthropy. 
In other words, the demand voiced is for a formal legal recognition of the 
practice and for a framework to address broader fair information practices in 
data philanthropy initiatives.  
Thus, and for reasons further discussed in Part IV, this Article asserts that 
the Fair Information Practice Principles (FIPs) are the best-suited host for data 
philanthropy. The FIPs are widely accepted principles for the protection of 
personal information that have been adopted and proposed, in various versions, 
by different institutions around the world, including the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the Canadian Standards 
Association, and the U.S. Federal Trade Commission.27 Specifically, two 
principles of the FIPs—purpose specification, which requires a concrete 
indication of personal data collection purposes, and use limitation, which 
mandates that subsequent use of the personal data does not exceed the purposes 
specified at collection—stand to block socially beneficial reuses of data in data 
philanthropy collaborations.28 This Article concludes that an exception to the 
FIPs would reconcile data philanthropy with the purpose specification and use 
limitation principles.29 In addition to prescribing guidelines for responsible 
sharing of personal information in data philanthropy initiatives, a FIPs exception 
would also provide legal acknowledgment of the practice and introduce it to 
smaller private sector actors. 
The data philanthropy exception would only apply when privacy 
protections prevent or limit socially beneficial reuse of data. The exception 
provides a three-tiered review process for determining the appropriate balance 
between privacy protections and social benefit in any given case. The socially 
beneficial reuse is first classified as one of three use privileges: exigencies 
(emergencies at which the use of the data is required under time pressure and 
high risk); responses (uses of corporate data to advance solutions to social 
problems); or collective knowledge (corporate data is used for research and 
knowledge advancements). Next, the review requires a risk assessment to 
account for the potential informational harm involved in reuse, as well as the 
 
 25. See, e.g., Data Policy, supra note 16. 
 26. See infra Subpart III.B. 
 27. Robert Gellman, Fair Information Practices: A Basic History (Apr. 10, 2017), 
https://bobgellman.com/rg-docs/rg-FIPshistory.pdf. 
 28. Aaron Fluitt, Executive Summary: Report from the Georgetown Law Round Table on the Ethical Reuse 
of Data in a Machine Learning World, TECH. & PRIVACY L. BLOG (Mar. 26, 2018), 
https://www.techprivacylawblog.com/executive-summary-report-from-the-georgetown-law-round-table-on-
the-ethical-reuse-of-data-in-a-machine-learning-world/.  
 29. See infra Subpart IV.B.  
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likely harm resulting from not using the information. After a use has been 
categorized under one of the three use privileges and a risk assessment has been 
conducted, the exception mandates the setting of a retention time for the reused 
data. 
A data philanthropy exception to the FIPs would confirm legal recognition 
of widely appreciated corporate data sharing practices and provide legal 
guidance on responsible sharing. The wide reach of the FIPs could bring data 
philanthropy to the attention of smaller market players who may have not been 
familiar with the practice and direct them towards privacy-mindful initiatives. 
Legal engagement with data philanthropy is also likely to stir discussions in 
other areas of law about the promise and perils of the practice well beyond 
privacy law. But, perhaps more importantly, data philanthropy offers an 
opportunity to consider how the law can protect and promote the use of private 
data for public good.  
I. BACKGROUND AND SCOPE 
The term “Data Philanthropy” was reportedly coined by World Economic 
Forum CTO Brian Behlendorf during a spontaneous conversation at the 2011 
World Economic Forum.30 The definition of data philanthropy is unsettled and 
includes several variations, such as the “donation of privately-held commercial 
data towards beneficial causes,”31 a “partnership in which private sector 
companies share data for public benefit,”32 “the act of sharing private data assets 
to serve the public good,”33 and “companies sharing proprietary datasets for 
social good.”34 Nonetheless, all of these interpretations involve the same basic 
scenario—the use of privately collected data for socially beneficial purposes. 
The term data philanthropy can theoretically apply to many forms of data 
sharing, but this project centers on one common type of sharing, where (1) 
privately-held data or proprietary data-driven insights (2) are shared or given 
access to (3) for the public good. This form of sharing has frequently been 
labeled either “data philanthropy” or “data collaboratives.”35 
 
 30. Nathan Wolfe et al., Crunching Digital Data Can Help the World, CNN (Feb. 2, 2011), 
http://www.cnn.com/2011/OPINION/02/02/wolfe.gunasekara.bogue.data/. 
 31. Jane Wu, Big Data Philanthropy: The Social Impact of Donating Data, LINKEDIN (July 1, 2015), 
https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/data-philanthropy-social-impact-donating-june-wu. 
 32. Andreas Pawelke & Anoush Rima Tatevossian, Data Philanthropy: Where Are We Now? UNITED 
NATIONS GLOBAL PULSE: BLOG (May 8, 2013), http://www.unglobalpulse.org/data-philanthropy-where-are-we-
now.  
 33. BRICE MCKEEVER ET AL., DATA PHILANTHROPY, UNLOCKING THE POWER OF PRIVATE DATA FOR 
PUBLIC GOOD 1 (2018), https://www.urban.org/research/publication/data-philanthropy-unlocking-power-
private-data-public-good/view/full_report.  
 34. Patrick Meier, Big Data Philanthropy for Humanitarian Response, IREVOLUTIONS (June 4, 2012), 
https://irevolutions.org/2012/06/04/big-data-philanthropy-for-humanitarian-response/. 
 35. Stefaan Verhulst and David Sangokoya propose the term “data collaboratives” to describe data 
exchange to help solve public problems. See Stefaan Verhulst & David Sangokoya, Data Collaboratives: 
Exchanging Data to Improve People’s Lives, MEDIUM (Apr. 22, 2015), https://medium.com/@sverhulst/data-
collaboratives-exchanging-data-to-improve-people-s-lives-d0fcfc1bdd9a. 
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Characterizing data sharing of this sort as philanthropy is not without 
objectors.36 Philanthropy has been criticized as patronage, reinforcement of 
social forces of hegemony and control, and as a representation of the systemic 
failures in modern societies.37 Traditional definitions of philanthropy also 
assume altruistic giving that originates in the “love of mankind.”38 The 
attribution of such noble motivations to profit-maximizing entities is also met 
with skepticism.39  
The term “philanthropy,” as applied in this context, also stands on shaky 
legal ground. In legal terms, while private sector actors collect personal 
information under contractual authorization from the information subject, it is 
not entirely clear that the collectors become owners of the information in the 
legal sense.40 If private sector actors only have a license to use this information 
 
 36. For more on these objections, see Lev-Aretz, A Case for Precision, supra note 7.  
 37. Siobhan Daly, Philanthropy as an Essentially Contested Concept, INT’L J. OF VOLUNTARY & 
NONPROFIT ORG. 535, 542–44 (2012). 
 38. Marty Sulek, On the Modern Meaning of Philanthropy, 39 NONPROFIT & VOLUNTARY SECTOR Q. 193, 
196–200 (2010). 
 39. See, e.g., Daryl Koehn and Joe Ueng, Is Philanthropy Being Used by Corporate Wrongdoers to Buy 
Good Will?, 14 J. OF MGMT. & GOVERNANCE 1 (2010); Ming Jia and Zhe Zhang, Donating Money to Get Money: 
The Role of Corporate Philanthropy in Stakeholder Reactions to IPOs, 51 J. OF MGMT. STUD. 1118 (2014); 
Timothy S. Mescon and Donn J. Tilson, Corporate Philanthropy: A Strategic Approach to the Bottom-Line, 29.2 
CAL. MGMT. REV. 49 (1987). However, claims that philanthropy interferes with the traditional model of 
corporations, which involves making money, distributing it to stakeholders, and allowing them to decide how to 
spend it, show that, at least in some cases, philanthropy is motivated by reasons other than profit-maximization. 
See Milton Friedman, The Social Responsibility of Business Is to Increase Its Profits, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 13, 
1970) (arguing that the corporate executive’s responsibility is “to conduct the business in accordance with their 
desires, which generally will be to make as much money as possible while conforming to the basic rules of the 
society”). Responses to this argument have tended to revolve around the economic gains of philanthropy. See 
M. Todd Henderson & Anup Malani, Corporate Philanthropy and the Market for Altruism, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 
571 (2009); Faith Stevelman Kahn, Pandora’s Box: Managerial Discretion and the Problem of Corporate 
Philanthropy, 44 UCLA L. REV. 579 (1997); Michel E. Porter & Mark R. Kramer, The Competitive Advantage 
of Corporate Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV. (Dec. 2002), https://hbr.org/2002/12/the-competitive-advantage-
of-corporate-philanthropy (“Philanthropy can often be the most cost-effective way for a company to improve its 
competitive context, enabling companies to leverage the efforts and infrastructure of nonprofits and other 
institutions.”). 
 40. The intersection of privacy and property has been widely explored in legal scholarship. Some have 
called for data privacy to be viewed as a property right that grants them full control in their personal information. 
See, e.g., Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 1644–48 (1999); Jerry 
Kang, Information Privacy in Cyberspace Transactions, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1193, 1246–94 (1998). Others have 
rejected the property-based approach to privacy, claiming that it does not effectively protect privacy. See, e.g., 
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Warren and Brandeis Redux: Finding (More) Privacy Protection in Intellectual 
Property Lore, STAN. TECH. L. REV. 8 (1999). Others still find that such approach might even encourage the 
market for personal data rather than constraining it. See, e.g., Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information 
Property, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1283 (2000). In addition to the currently non-existing property rights of information 
subjects, U.S. copyright law does not protect databases absent some level of creativity in their creation. See Feist 
Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991). The most common rights structure in the market 
combines contractual confirmation of ownership of any rights related to consumer data together with trade 
secrecy protection. This combination allows businesses to protect themselves from intellectual property lawsuits 
and protect the collected data from free-riding competitors. 
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for specific purposes, as opposed to ownership of the data, can they legally 
donate it or authorize access to it?  
Because of the non-rivalry nature of data, “philanthropy” seems like an odd 
term to attribute to the sharing of private sector data for socially beneficial 
purposes. Traditional corporate philanthropy commonly involves the giving of 
money, other tangible gifts, or services.41 Each of these endowments involve 
both a cost for the corporate philanthropist and a practical limit on the amount 
that can be given without significantly interfering with the business’ operation 
and existence. Data, however, is offered for reuse, meaning that it could be 
donated at minimal to no cost and with no practical limit. A business can not 
only allow access to its collected information at a very low cost, but it can also 
offer its entire database for socially beneficial use while capitalizing on the same 
database for its business interests.  
The term “data collaboratives,” offered by Stefaan Verhulst and David 
Sangokoya,42 also fails to capture the essence of private sector sharing of data 
for social good. The “data collaboratives” term is useful and is not subject to 
some of the criticism that the term “data philanthropy” rightly receives. 
Nevertheless, the term “data collaborative” is both under-inclusive and over-
inclusive. The emphasis on collaboration leaves many instances of data sharing 
outside the scope of data collaboratives. For example, open data initiatives in the 
private sector, where datasets are released to the public with no continuous 
interaction between the public and the provider of the data following the release, 
can hardly be described as collaborative. The data collaboratives universe also 
appears to be broader than that of data philanthropy, as it covers access to public 
sector data. Most importantly, the data collaborative definition does not 
underscore the sharing of privately-held data or privately-owned, data-driven 
insights. It fails to highlight the monetary and business value of the data and 
does not reflect the ecosystem in which private sector data is shared. 
In the absence of an alternative definition targeting the scope of what has 
been termed “data philanthropy,” this Article adopts the term “data 
philanthropy” subject to the objections expressed above. To better understand 
the contours of data philanthropy, it is essential to distinguish this form of “data-
for-good” from other forms of data-sharing, to refine the “data,” “sharing,” and 
“public good” aspects of the definition, and to illustrate the promise and perils 
of data philanthropy through real-life examples. 
A. DATA FOR GOOD 
The idea that privately held or owned data should be used to promote the 
greater good has its roots in the open data movement.43 The open data movement 
has advocated for the release of governmental data in machine-readable, 
 
 41. Sulek, supra note 38 at 200; see also Bruce Seifert et al., Having, Giving, and Getting: Slack Resources, 
Corporate Philanthropy, and Firm Financial Performance, 43 BUS. AND SOC’Y 135 (2004).  
 42. Verhulst and Sangokoya, supra note 35. 
 43. Alemanno, supra note 6, at 185.  
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downloadable, usable, and distributable formats.44 These efforts have been 
celebrated as a means of transparency, accountability, and civic participation, 
and have led governments worldwide to open up countless datasets.45 The open 
data movement also rests on the understanding that the rise of big data and 
advances in the capture, collection, real-time processing, analysis, sharing, and 
visualization of information can advance a better understanding of social 
problems and direct practical solutions.46  
Because much of the data needed to address societal challenges rests in 
private hands, calls to make data available for socially beneficial reuses have 
expanded their targets from states and public entities to the private sector.47 
Unlike public sector data sharing, private sector data sharing triggers 
competitive and privacy risks that directly affect value for money and return on 
investment.48 Yet, many private sector players have joined the cause with 
various “data-for-good” initiatives, outlined below: data analytics services, data 
storage and data-based utilities, monetary donations for data science education 
and development, individual data sharing, and data philanthropy.  
Data Analytics Services: DataKind is a non-profit organization dedicated 
to using data science to address critical humanitarian issues by pairing high-
impact organizations with leading data scientists.49 DataKind, together with 
other NGOs like Bayes Impact and corporations like IBM and SAS,50 is part of 
the Data-for-Good movement, which advocates meaningful utilization of data to 
solve humanitarian issues around poverty, health, human rights, education and 
the environment.51 In practice, DataKind’s mission and most of the Data-for-
 
 44. Tim Berners-Lee, The Year Open Data Went Worldwide, TED (Feb. 2010), https://www.ted.com/ 
talks/tim_berners_lee_the_year_open_data_went_worldwide?language=en. 
 45. See, e.g., Jillian Raines, The Digital Accountability and Transparency Act of 2011 (DATA): Using 
Open Data Principles to Revamp Spending Transparency Legislation, 57 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 313 (2013); 
Anneke Zuiderwijk and Marijn Janssen, Open Data Policies, Their Implementation and Impact: A Framework 
for Comparison, 31 GOV’T INFO. Q. 17 (2014). 
 46. STEFAAN VERHULST & ANDREW YOUNG, OPEN DATA IMPACT: WHEN DEMAND AND SUPPLY MEET 7–
8 (Mar. 2016), http://odimpact.org/files/open-data-impact-key-findings.pdf. 
 47. See Rajesh Chandy et al., Big Data for Good: Insights from Emerging Markets, 34 J. PRODUCT 
INNOVATION MGMT. 703 (2017); Frederika Welle Donker et al., Open Data and Beyond, 5 INT’L J. GEO-INFO. 
48 (2016), http://www.mdpi.com/2220-9964/5/4/48/htm (arguing that private organizations that are mandated 
to perform a public task and generate data in the process should not be exempt from open government data 
policies); Beth Simone Noveck, Data Collaboratives: Sharing Public Data in Private Hands for Social Good, 
FORBES (Sept. 24, 2015), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bethsimonenoveck/2015/09/24/private-data-sharing-
for-publicgood/#209e001d51cd. 
 48. Open Data, Driving Growth, Ingenuity, and Innovation, DELOITTE ANALYTICS (2012), 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/deloitte-analytics/open-data-driving-growth-
ingenuity-and-innovation.pdf. 
 49. DATAKIND, http://www.datakind.org/ (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 50. BAYES IMPACT, http://www.bayesimpact.org/ (last visited July 2, 2019). Data Science for a Better 
World, IBM RESEARCH BLOG (Jan. 21, 2016), https://www.ibm.com/blogs/research/2016/01/data-science-for-
a-better-world/. Data for Good: Analytics Helping Humanity, SAS, https://www.sas.com/en_us/data-for-
good.html# (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 51. Jake Porway, Using Collaboration to Harness Big Data for Social Good, STAN. SOC. INNOVATION 
REV. (June 14, 2017), https://ssir.org/articles/entry/using_collaboration_to_harness_big_data_for_social_good. 
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Good movement revolve around the donation of data analytics services to high-
impact social organizations.  
Data Storage and Data-based Utilities: The Microsoft Corporation 
committed to donating $1 billion of Microsoft Cloud Services for the use of 
nonprofits and university researchers between 2016 and 2019.52 The cloud 
services allow users to securely store their data, compute on the cloud platform, 
turn data into actionable insight using effective data management tools and 
advanced analytics, and capitalize on the cutting-edge technologies of the 
Internet of Things and artificial intelligence.53 These services offer useful tools 
for the collection, storage, and management of data, but do not involve the giving 
of actual data. Another example from Microsoft is the language translation 
systems the company developed to help relief workers communicate with the 
local community in Haiti after the destructive 2010 earthquake.54 
Monetary Donations for Data Science Education and Development: 
Tableau Software announced grants to DataKind and Bayes Impact in support 
of the Data-for-Good movement.55 Dartmouth alumnus William H. Neukom has 
committed $10 million to his alma mater for expanding and improving the 
school’s data science programs.56 While efforts like these contribute both 
directly and indirectly to data-driven innovation for the greater good, they 
implicate different promises and perils than donations of data.57 
Individual Data Sharing: Individuals, too, can share data for socially 
beneficial ends. Two kinds of data are shared on an individual basis: personal 
data about the sharing individual and data collected to which individuals own 
the intellectual property rights. The Personal Genome Project, which lets 
participants share their genome sequence and health data for the use of 
researchers, illustrates the first category. 58 The second category includes 
 
 52. Microsoft Philanthropies Announces Commitment to Donate $1 Billion in Cloud Computing Resources 
to Serve the Public Good, MICROSOFT (Jan. 19, 2016), https://news.microsoft.com/2016/01/19/microsoft-
philanthropies-announces-commitment-to-donate-1-billion-in-cloud-computing-resources-to-serve-the-public-
good/.  
 53. Microsoft Enterprise, MICROSOFT, https://onedrive.live.com/about/en-us/ (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 54. See Janie Chang, Translator Fast-Tracks Haitian Creole, MICROSOFT: RESEARCH BLOG (Feb. 4, 2010), 
https://www.microsoft.com/en-us/research/blog/translator-fast-tracks-haitian-creole/. 
 55. Press Release, Tableau Software, Tableau Foundation Supports Data for Good Movement with Grants 
to DataKind and Bayes Impact (Mar. 12, 2015), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/tableau-
foundation-supports-data-for-good-movement-with-grants-to-datakind-and-bayes-impact-300049382.html. 
 56. Dartmouth Announces $10 Million Gift from Bill Neukom ‘64, DARTMOUTH NEWS (Apr. 30, 2014), 
https://news.dartmouth.edu/news/2014/04/dartmouth-announces-10-million-gift-bill-neukom-64. 
 57. For example, privacy and security risks are only marginal in this context, and considerations around 
tax breaks are more crucial for monetary donations of this sort than they currently are for data donations.  
 58. THE PERSONAL GENOME PROJECT, http://personalgenomes.org/ (last visited July 27, 2019); see also 
AMERICAN GUT, http://americangut.org/ (last visited July 27, 2019) (facilitating participation in studies about 
gut microbiome); Rumi Chunara & Sofia Ahsanuddin, The GoViral Study, J. GLOBAL HEALTH (June 14, 2016), 
https://www.ghjournal.org/the-goviral-study/ (last visited July 27, 2019) (using collected specimens from people 
who experience the flu or flulike symptoms). There are also examples of initiatives where individual data 
donation is only partially central to their business model, such as the personalized health network. 
PATIENTSLIKEME, http://news.patientslikeme.com/ (last visited July 27, 2019) (allowing patients to learn about 
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“citizen scientists,” amateur individuals who help professional scientists to 
speed up discoveries and innovation.59 Among other voluntary supporting acts, 
citizen scientists share information they digitally collect by observing 
environments, monitoring neighborhoods, and documenting occurrences that 
may contribute to the advancement of knowledge.60 
Each type of initiative yields a variety of benefits and prompts a host of 
challenges, some of which have already been spotlighted and analyzed in 
academic scholarship. This Article, however, exclusively addresses data 
philanthropy, loosely defined, as the sharing of privately held data for socially 
beneficial purposes.  
B. THE DEFINITION OF DATA PHILANTHROPY 
Data philanthropy is largely defined through the combination of three 
elements: (1) unpaid for sharing of or access to (2) privately held data or 
proprietary data insights for (3) the greater good. Under this framework, data 
philanthropy may present itself in several configurations that are directly linked 
to the “sharing/access” model, the unique value of data, relevant stakeholders, 
sharing motivations, and the definition of socially beneficial causes. After 
discussing these elements of the definition, I move to discuss an additional 
element that current definitions of data philanthropy are missing: reuse outside 
the business model.  
1. Sharing/Access Model  
Scholars have identified five generic categories of data sharing: in-house 
production of statistics, transfer of data sets to end users, remote access, trusted 
third parties, and moving the algorithms.61  
The first model, in-house production of statistics, is the most common 
model of collaboration.62 Businesses do not grant access to the data itself, but 
 
new treatment options, meeting others with similar medical conditions, and opting to contribute data for 
research). 
 59. See generally CAREN COOPER, CITIZEN SCIENCE: HOW ORDINARY PEOPLE ARE CHANGING THE FACE 
OF DISCOVERY (2016); Jonathan Silvertown, A New Dawn for Citizen Science, 24 TRENDS IN ECOLOGY & 
EVOLUTION 467 (2009).  
 60. For example, volunteers for the British “Track a Tree” project record and collect information about 
woodland trees and flowering plants to “provide insights into the seasonal timing of woodland species, and how 
future changes in climate may affect the interactions between trees and flowering plants.” What is Track a Tree?, 
TRACK A TREE, http://trackatree.bio.ed.ac.uk/about (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 61. Thilo Klein and Stefaan Verhulst, Access to New Data Sources for Statistics: Business Models and 
Incentives for the Corporate Sector, PARIS21 PARTNERSHIP IN STAT. FOR DEV. IN THE 21ST CENTURY 17 
(Discussion Paper No. 10, 2017), http://www.thegovlab.org/static/files/publications/paris-21.pdf. In addition to 
these models, a sixth model is emerging under which deep learning models, as opposed to the data itself, are 
being shared and run concurrently on several data sets. This method is especially helpful in the context of medical 
data that is held by multiple holders, but each holder holds a small sample size that by itself cannot produce 
reliable results. See Ken Chang et al., Distributed Deep Learning Networks among Institutions for Medical 
Imaging, 28 J. AM. MED. INFORMATICS ASS’N 945 (2018).  
 62. Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 17. 
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analyze the data in-house and release or otherwise share the resulting statistics. 
By analyzing the data in-house, private sector actors can retain control over the 
generation and use of the data, guarantee adherence to standards of users’ 
privacy protection, and increase data security.63 MasterCard, for example, offers 
what it terms “data knowledge” through its Center for Inclusive Growth.64 After 
identifying a need for better data, MasterCard’s in-house experts analyze the 
relevant company’s data and release the findings for broader use.65 The internal 
production of statistics is limited to utilizing the expertise of company 
employees only; it does not leverage external skills. This model also requires 
internal infrastructure and technical mastery that smaller players often cannot 
afford.66 Another example for this type of sharing is Facebook’s “Disaster 
Maps.” Launched in 2017, Facebook’s Disaster Maps uses aggregated, 
anonymized Facebook data in disaster areas to deliver crucial information to aid 
organizations during and after crises.67 By offering location density maps, 
movement maps, and safety check maps, Facebook shares the deliverable 
insights from the data analyzed, without sharing the actual data.68  
Under the second model, private sector actors share data by transferring 
copies of data sets directly to end-users.69 Users then develop their algorithms 
to run on the often de-identified and aggregated data.70 Access to granular data 
is most effective for research purposes, where analysis entails detailed 
information and the merger of different data sets and sources.71 Producers 
relinquishing control of this data, however, increase operational risks of data 
leakage, security breaches, and privacy harms.72 Telecom company Orange used 
this sharing model in its Data for Development (“D4D”) challenge,73 in which 
selected researchers are granted access to transformed mobile data in order to 
develop applications for socially beneficial purposes, like disease monitoring 
and public transport improvement for developing countries.74 Past challenges 
 
 63. Id. 
 64. Shamina Singh, A Call to Action on Data Philanthropy, MASTERCARD CTR FOR INCLUSIVE GROWTH 
(Oct. 4, 2016), https://mastercardcenter.org/action/call-action-data-philanthropy/. 
 65. Id. (“For example, in partnership with the White House’s Data Driven Justice Initiative—an effort to 
use data to help advance criminal justice reform—the Center was able to perform an analysis to demonstrate the 
impact crime has on merchant locations and local job opportunities in Baltimore.”). 
 66. Id. 
 67. Molly Jackman, Using Data to Help Communities Recover and Rebuild, FACEBOOK NEWSROOM, June 
7, 2017, https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2017/06/using-data-to-help-communities-recover-and-rebuild/. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 19.  
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.  
 73. Data for Development, ORANGE, https://www.orange.com/en/Footer/Thematic-features/2013/D4D/ 
Data-for-Development (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 74. Id. 
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successfully forecasted the spread of epidemics and improved evaluation of 
internal migration and population density.75  
Under this model, the data is sometimes offered in the form of open data 
repositories. Like its governmental counterpart, private sector open data 
involves the release of privately-owned data in machine-readable, 
downloadable, usable, and distributable formats, available for anyone to access 
and reuse. Yahoo!, for instance, through its Webscope Program, offers a 
reference library of “interesting and scientifically useful datasets for non-
commercial use by academics and other scientists.”76 Google has released 
several datasets including: data on requests to remove content due to copyright; 
visual databases for machine learning researchers in collaboration with Carnegie 
Mellon and Cornell University; and YouTube-8M, a dataset of 8 million labeled 
YouTube videos for video understanding research.77 In addition, Uber 
introduced Uber Movement, a website where users can access some of the 
company’s internal demand and usage data.78  
In the third model of data sharing, end users securely access the data 
remotely while data controllers maintain control over the extracted 
information.79 Unlike the second model, under the remote access model, data is 
not duplicated and does not leave the premises of the data holder. When sharing 
remotely, data holders activate strict monitoring of the input and output traffic 
on their data storage devices to safeguard the shared data, and users can only 
export the final aggregated metrics.80 Commonly, data holders outsource the 
 
 75. Antonio Lima et al., Progmosis: Evaluating Risky Individual Behavior During Epidemics Using Mobile 
Network Data 1 (2015) (unpublished manuscript), https://arxiv.org/abs/1504.01316. See Gabriel Pestre et al., 
The ABCDE of Big Data: Assessing Biases in Call-Detail Records for Development Estimates, ANN. WORLD 
BANK CONF. ON DEV. ECON. 1, 1 (2016), http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/551311466182785065/Pestre-
Letouze-Zagheni-ABCDE-May-2016.pdf. Other companies have also made their datasets available via 
challenges or competitions, where technologists are encouraged to conduct research or analysis on the data and 
share their discoveries. For example, Yelp offers a dataset challenge. Yelp Dataset Challenge, YELP, 
https://www.yelp.com/dataset/challenge (last visited July 27, 2019). Netflix initiated its famous Netflix Prize, 
an open competition for the best collaborative filtering algorithm to predict user ratings for films based on 
previous ratings only. Netflix Prize, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Netflix_Prize (last visited July 27, 
2019). Facebook held a Recruiting Competition where the donors of top entries received the opportunity to 
interview with the company. Facebook Recruiting Competition, KAGGLE, 
https://www.kaggle.com/c/FacebookRecruiting (last visited July 27, 2019).  
 76. Webscope: Datasets, YAHOO!, https://webscope.sandbox.yahoo.com/ (last visited July 27, 2019). In 
early 2016, Yahoo released its largest-ever machine learning dataset to the academic research community. Sarah 
Perez, Yahoo Releases its Biggest-Ever Machine Learning Dataset to the Research Community, TECHCRUNCH 
(Jan. 14, 2016), https://techcrunch.com/2016/01/14/yahoo-releases-its-biggest-ever-machine-learning-dataset-
to-the-research-community/. 
 77. Sudheendra Vijayanarasimhan & Paul Natsev, Announcing YouTube-8M: A Large and Diverse 
Labeled Video Dataset for Video Understanding Research, GOOGLE: AI BLOG (Sept. 28, 2016), https:// 
research.googleblog.com/2016/09/announcing-youtube-8m-large-and-diverse.html. 
 78. Movement Cities, UBER MOVEMENT, https://movement.uber.com/cities?lang=en-US (last visited July 
27, 2019). 
 79. Klein and Verhulst, supra note 61, at 21. This model, as well as the fourth model, are also referred to 
as “privileged access.” See Fluitt, supra note 28, at 15–16.  
 80. Klein and Verhulst, supra note 61, at 21.  
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operation of remote access-based collaborations to external third parties.81 This 
model sets a fertile ground for data philanthropy collaborations with relatively 
low operational risks. Identification risks, however, still exist, and so does the 
potential of losing a competitive edge as competitors may attempt to extract 
strategic insights from the aggregates.82 The collaboration between Flowminder 
and Ncell, mentioned above, is a typical example of the remote access model.83 
Flowminder’s reports on largest-scale population displacements after a natural 
disaster were produced through remote access and were later shared with the 
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs and other 
key agencies for pre-disaster preparations and more effective post-disaster 
relief.84 
In the fourth model of data sharing, data holders and users rely on a trusted 
third party to facilitate secure access to the data.85 To maximize protection, users 
do not have direct access to the raw data and, instead, must request reports or 
transitional results from a trusted facilitator.86 Trusted third parties must possess 
reliable technical infrastructure, including large data storage capacity and secure 
connections.87 While this model increases the operational risk level as more 
external parties handle the data, it lowers costs and streamlines the data sharing 
process.88  
In the fifth model, the data remains in the data holder’s possession, and the 
data holder runs an algorithm of the data user’s choice.89 With shared algorithms, 
different data holders can perform the same analytical functions on their data 
sets without merging them with data sets from their competitors.90 The results 
that are shared directly with users can be merged for the sake of a more 
comprehensive analysis.91 The algorithmic sharing model lessens many of the 
risks of the other models, as most of the analyses take place within data holder’s 
premises.  
2. The Unique Value of Data 
A private sector actor acquires an interest in data through collecting the 
data itself or by purchasing data captured by other players. In the course of 
supporting a product or providing a service, businesses can actively gather 
information by, for example, conducting surveys or passively collecting data 
 
 81. Id. 
 82. Id. at 21–22. 
 83. Case Study: Nepal Earthquake 2015, FLOWMINDER, http://www.flowminder.org/case-studies/nepal-
earthquake-2015 (last visited July 27, 2019).  
 84. Id. 
 85. Klein and Verhulst, supra note 61, at 22–23. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 23–24. 
 90. Klein and Verhulst, supra note 61, at 23–24. 
 91. Id. 
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such as by recording geo-location. The potential for targeting-based 
monetization, either by the collecting company or by a third party acquiring the 
data, motivates most passive collection.92 While users’ explicit consent is a 
prerequisite for lawful data collection and use, collection of personal 
information is assumed to be permitted even when users have not explicitly 
given consent (commonly through clickwrap and browsewrap agreements).93  
Several qualities of big data have induced the growing interest in potential 
uses of private data for the public good. There is an increasing demand for 
evidence-based social action, both in the process of devising policy and in 
practical terms.94 Technological tools facilitate the capturing and monitoring of 
social activities, and analysis of the data produces actionable insights. The 
ability to capture and analyze real-time measurements is especially valuable for 
social action that must often quickly respond to unforeseeable events while 
evaluating short-term policies in the course of the response.95 Big data can also 
increase the exposure and visibility of less conspicuous social action that is 
happening “below the radar” as individuals team up to identify and address a 
social issue.96 Algorithms that detect hidden trends and patterns in data and 
analysis that foresees future development with a relatively high level of accuracy 
are also immensely valuable for social action. For example, these systems can 
not only identify individuals in need during humanitarian crises but also forecast 
their movements, advancing more efficient allocation of resources.97 Big data 
technologies also have potential uses that were unknown when the technology 
was first developed, and these potential uses later turn out to be of great worth 
over time.98  
In this context, mobile data possesses a set of unique qualities and is 
considered especially useful for social action.99 In addition to assuring 
ubiquitous connectivity, mobile technologies are virtually always switched 
on.100 Consequently, users leave an uninterrupted track of records that is both 
 
 92. Katherine J. Strandburg, Free Fall: The Online Market’s Consumer Preference Disconnect, 2013 U. 
CHI. LEGAL F. 95, 95 (2013). 
 93. Facebook allowing developers to scrape information from its platform until 2014 exemplifies this 
notion.  
 94. Claudia J. Coulton et al., Harnessing Big Data for Social Good: A Grand Challenge for Social Work 4 
(Am. Acad. of Soc. Work & Soc. Welfare, Working Paper No. 11, 2015), 
http://grandchallengesforsocialwork.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/WP11-with-cover.pdf. 
 95. Chandy et al., supra note 47. 
 96. NESTA, DATA FOR GOOD: HOW BIG AND OPEN DATA CAN BE USED FOR THE COMMON GOOD 25 (Peter 
Baeck ed., 2015), https://media.nesta.org.uk/documents/dataforgood.pdf. 
 97. KATIE WHIPKEY & ANDREJ VERITY, GUIDANCE FOR INCORPORATING BIG DATA INTO HUMANITARIAN 
OPERATIONS 7 (2015), http://digitalhumanitarians.com/sites/default/files/resource-field_media/ 
IncorporatingBigDataintoHumanitarianOps-2015.pdf. 
 98. Chandy et al., supra note 47, at 710.  
 99. In fact, the UN Global Pulse has dedicated significant time to studying the state of mobile data for 
social good. See Mobile Data for Social Good Report, supra note 3. 
 100. Chandy et al., supra note 47, at 710. 
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high volume and granular.101 Because cell ranges can cover less than a thousand 
meters in heavily populated areas, mobile data offers a high spatial resolution.102 
Mobile data is also of particular interest for humanitarian organizations because 
it can reveal population movements. Tracking these movements is crucial in the 
course of a natural disaster or disease outbreak, but it is also constructive for 
urban planning purposes.103 Mobile data can also shed light on socio-economic 
trends, as well as the economic health and resilience of communities.104 
3. Stakeholders 
Data philanthropy entangles various stakeholders, each of which is guided 
by distinctive interests and tasked with turning the data into socially beneficial 
insights. Effective policy proposals must account for the complex operation of 
data philanthropy and identify both the stakeholder groups and the interests 
driving them. For this discussion, the most useful and inclusive taxonomy to 
describe the roles of stakeholders within the data philanthropy universe, which 
is suggested by Mikel Niño and others, distinguishes between problem holders, 
data holders, and skill holders.105 The relationships between the different 
stakeholders are commonly facilitated by contracts that define roles, 
responsibilities, rights, and duties. 
Problem Holders are the individuals or institutions closest to the target 
population affected by the social issue that the data-driven strategy tackles.106 
Stakeholders in this group usually include representatives of public 
administration, like governmental agencies and non-profit organizations, who 
work to identify the social problem, the needs of affected groups, and potential 
solutions.107 Ideally positioned to provide key knowledge to other stakeholders, 
the problem holders act as a resourceful intermediary. They express the interests 
of the target population members who do not directly interact with other 
stakeholders. By doing so, the problem holders not only give voice to isolated 
or otherwise muted collectives, but also improve the data-driven solution by 
sharing their perspectives with the skill and data holders.  
Data Holders include the individuals or institutions that hold the data. The 
specifics of the interest in the data depend on the particular instance of data 
 
 101. Nicholas Robin et al., Public-Private Partnerships for Statistics: Lessons Learned, Future Steps 6–7 
(OECD, Working Paper No. 27, 2016), https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/5jm3nqp1g8wf-
en.pdf?expires=1562909961&id=id&accname=guest&checksum=DD01771516A6A731342E12B4DE0DA91
0. 
 102. Id. 
 103. MOBILE DATA FOR SOCIAL GOOD REPORT, supra note 3, at 5.  
 104. Id. 
 105. Mikel Niño et al., Data Projects for “Social Good”: Challenges and Opportunities, 11 INT’L J. 
HUMAN. & SOC. SCI. 1094 (2017). The mobile data for social good report proposes a more detailed list of 
stakeholders that includes roles such as the Data Producer (the individual creating the data), and Data Steward 
(the one entrusted with monitoring and evaluating the data to confirm its adherence to agreed standards). See 
MOBILE DATA FOR SOCIAL GOOD REPORT, supra note 3, at 10, tbl. 2. 
 106. Niño et al., supra note 105, at 1097. 
 107. Id. 
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sharing; the interest may arise because the data holder collected the data or 
otherwise acquired intellectual property or contractual rights in the data. While 
one might assume that this group includes the data subjects,108 i.e., those 
generating the relevant data to be analyzed, from a legal perspective, such an 
assumption is mostly incorrect. U.S. law treats notice and consent as the legal 
threshold for lawful collection of information, but does not recognize any 
proprietary interest of data subjects.109 
Skill Holders are equipped with the technological expertise to extract 
actionable insights from the data. These data experts make up for the data 
illiteracy and lesser technological expertise of other stakeholders.110 They 
possess data analytics skills and translate the results to the problem holders so 
the latter can then devise relevant policy solutions or practical strategies to 
address the social issue. Examples of skill holders include the UN Global 
Pulse,111 DataKind,112 and academic researchers.  
These categories are not firmly distinct; in fact, they often merge. For 
example, when a public organization or an NGO has been gathering information 
on a social issue it is attempting to address, it would act as both a problem holder 
and a data holder. Similarly, data holders may, at times, operate as skill holders 
too. For example, in 2016, Facebook analyzed data pulled from Brazilian users’ 
posts about Zika.113 The social media giant then shared the insights with 
UNICEF, which incorporated the findings into a successful ad campaign, 
resulting in more awareness and preventive measure-taking in the Brazilian 
population.114 
Differentiating between the various stakeholders, however, is essential to 
guarantee a balanced data philanthropy partnership. Each of the stakeholders 
hold interests that are indispensable for a data-based collaboration for the greater 
good: without the problem holders, there is no one to safeguard the interests of 
affected communities; without the data holders, there is no data to analyze; and 
without the skill holders, data is useless. 
4. Sharing Incentives 
Incentives to collaborate vary among the groups of stakeholders. As 
representatives of affected communities, problem holders work with other 
 
 108. In fact, Niño and others make specific reference to the data subjects as part of the data holders’ group, 
“Sometimes the people or collective in need are indeed a data source in themselves. For instance, their 
interactions with different systems or services could generate relevant data to be processed and analyzed in the 
project.” Id. 
 109. See, e.g., Daniel J. Solove, Privacy Self-Management and the Consent Dilemma, 126 HARV. L. REV. 
1880 (2013) [hereinafter Privacy Self-Management]. 
 110. Niño, supra note 105, at 1097.  
 111. Global Pulse is a flagship innovation initiative of the United Nations Secretary-General on big data. 
See UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL PULSE, https://www.unglobalpulse.org/ (last visited July 27, 2019).  
 112. DATAKIND, supra note 49.  
 113. Catherine Cheney, How Facebook Statuses Informed the Zika Response in Brazil, DEVEX (Dec. 13, 
2016), https://www.devex.com/news/how-facebook-statuses-informed-the-zika-response-in-brazil-89290.  
 114. Id. 
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stakeholders to solve the social issues that interfere with or risk the lives of 
people from those communities. Their motivation is mostly altruistic and is 
reinforced systematically through their form of governance—commonly, public 
agencies or NGOs. Depending on their organizational affiliation, skill holders 
may share a similar set of altruistic interests, offering their analytics skills as a 
donation of services to promote a socially beneficial end.115 Skill holders can 
also collaborate to promote an individual goal with or without an altruistic 
aspect. For example, while academic researchers often pursue certain studies 
from public-spirited perspectives, they are also motivated by professional 
aspirations.  
These motivations are broad data-for-good motivations. As the term 
“philanthropy” suggests, data philanthropy mostly points to the sharing 
motivations of data holders, especially to the extent they operate in the private 
sector. The information economy flourishes because data is a valuable financial 
asset. Access to privately-held data and data-driven insights have a price tag in 
the market, and when data holders choose to give them away for free, they lose 
potential income. Sharing also exposes data holders to a variety of risks, as 
explained below,116 making the motivation question even more puzzling: why 
would private businesses share their data for socially beneficial purposes at no 
cost?  
Corporations are inclined to allow access to, or sharing of, collected data 
for a variety of reasons. Thilo Klein and Stefaan Verhulst map out different 
business incentives for data-based collaborations.117 According to Klein and 
Verhulst, sharing motivations depend on the context of the sharing, the questions 
posed, and the corporate and legal culture of the firm.118 Even though their 
taxonomy is aimed at data collaboratives and not data philanthropy, the 
classification works well to describe most of the interests’ dynamics in data 
philanthropy. Klein and Verhulst suggest six categories of sharing incentives: 
reciprocity; research, recruitment and insights; reputation and public relations; 
increasing revenue; regulatory compliance; and responsibility and corporate 
philanthropy.119  
Reciprocity: Klein and Verhulst describe two types of reciprocity 
scenarios. The first involves pure business interest—the sharing could produce 
mutual benefits for the data holder and the other stakeholders, especially if the 
combination of the data holder’s data and data from other sources provides some 
advantage to the former.120 This setup is common when the collaboration 
involves only private sector for-profit actors, such as the Accelerating Medicines 
Partnership, where pharmaceutical companies share genetic and molecular data 
 
 115. DATAKIND, supra note 49 (epitomizing donation of data-analytics services for socially beneficial 
purposes).  
 116. See infra Subparts I.C.1, I.C.2 and accompanying text.  
 117. Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 9–13. 
 118. Id. at 9. 
 119. Id. at 9–13. 
 120. Id. at 9. 
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in a data pool.121 Although such collaborations foster innovation and promote 
social interests, it is questionable to classify them as data philanthropy. It is a 
business partnership that happens to benefit the public, with no problem holder 
to communicate the problems of the affected population and safeguard its 
interests. If a problem holder is present in this kind of collaboration and the 
social issue, as opposed to the business interest, was seen as instrumental in the 
process, this type of reciprocity motivation would apply. 
The second type of reciprocity, which is more applicable to data 
philanthropy, is one of compensation. Companies that collect personal 
information give back to counterbalance what they have taken from individuals 
and society at large.122 This kind of data philanthropy acts as a non-mandatory 
surveillance tax, similar to the carbon tax: a company that pollutes society with 
surveillance “pays” by donating some of its data for socially beneficial causes.  
Research, Recruitment, and Insights: Opening up data may help companies 
generate new insights that they cannot, as a practical matter, or should not, as a 
financial matter, generate in-house.123 Sharing data allows companies to enjoy 
data analytics expertise that their employees may not possess, often free of 
charge.124 By exploring the data in new ways, outsiders could expose potentially 
promising business models and identify themselves as talented hires for the 
sharing business.125 The Orange D4D challenge exemplified this incentive,126 as 
does the Spanish Bank BBVA Innova Challenge, where participants gain access 
to some of the bank’s data.127 Past winners of the challenge have developed 
socially beneficial applications, such as one that predicts overcrowding in city 
buildings, as well as commercial solutions for the bank—for example, better 
ways to support customers.128 
Reputational Advantage: Sharing data for socially beneficial purposes 
could do wonders for a business’s reputation. When sharing is extensively 
publicized, private sector actors gain media attention, which could increase their 
exposure to potential users, investors, and business partners.129 For example, 
Orbital Insights, a data analytics company, shared satellite data and geo-
 
 121. Accelerating Medicines Partnership, NAT’L INST. OF HEALTH, https://www.nih.gov/research-
training/accelerating-medicines-partnership-amp (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 122. Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 9.  
 123. Id. at 10. 
 124. Id.; see also Jordana George et al., Data Philanthropy: An Explorative Study, in PROC. OF THE 52ND 
HAW. INT’L CONF. ON SYS. SCI. 5858, 5864 (2019) (“UPS gained additional logistics data, algorithms, and 
experiences from working in these high-risk regions. Such work also increased employee satisfaction & 
retention, particularly for talented data scientists such as Soldner Freeman.”). 
 125. Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 10. 
 126. See supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text. 
 127. Innova Challenge Big Data Highlight, BBVA, https://bbvaopen4u.com/en/actualidad/innova-
challenge-big-data-highlights (last visited July 27, 2019); see also Thomas Hale, The BBVA Bank Vaults That 
Hoard Data Instead of Bullion, FIN. TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/bbbfebc4-b79f-11e4-
981d-00144feab7de.  
 128. Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 10. 
 129. Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 11. 
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analytics in collaboration with the World Bank to track poverty around the 
world.130 This partnership spawned significant investor interest for Orbital, 
which, as of recently, has raised a total of $78.7 million.131  
The positive publicity is also a helpful asset for businesses in their ongoing 
relationship with policymakers. When lobbying or otherwise attempting to 
convince policymakers to pursue a certain course of action, companies can point 
to their data philanthropy history to demonstrate an alignment between the 
public interest and their business interest.  
Increasing Revenue: Klein and Verhulst explain that, in the course of data 
collaborations, corporate data is sometimes offered for sale, not shared for 
free.132 This direct form of increasing revenue is characteristic of data 
collaboratives but not of data philanthropy, which requires unpaid sharing of, or 
access to, privately-held data. Nevertheless, even though data philanthropy does 
not generate direct increase in revenue, it does, as the other incentives discussed 
in this Subpart demonstrate, indirectly cut costs and increase revenues for private 
sector actors in the short and long term. 
Regulatory Compliance: Some companies generate data to secure 
regulatory compliance, and sometimes data sharing is required under sectorial 
regulations.133 Repurposing data that is already collected or that must be shared 
for socially beneficial uses increases the value of the compliance-motivated 
investment.134 With this logic in mind, Apple, Cisco, Dell, and Google (among 
others) release the data they submit in their Employer Information Report (EEO-
1), a compliance survey mandated by the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission.135  
Responsibility and Corporate Philanthropy: Data philanthropy overlaps 
with traditional corporate philanthropy and corporate social responsibility 
principles. Corporate donation is a company’s way of giving back to the 
community, but is also valuable for the business, as the act of giving indirectly 
improves the competitive business environment.136 Sharing data for socially 
beneficial purposes could similarly better the operation ecosystem for the 
company.137  
 
 130. Id. at 11–12.; see also Orbital Insight, Leveraging Commercial Applications to Help the World Bank 
Map Poverty, MEDIUM (Jan. 4, 2017), https://medium.com/from-the-macroscope/leveraging-commercial-
applications-to-help-the-world-bank-map-poverty-79bca51814ee.  
 131. Orbital Insight Raises $50 Million to Track Economies from Space, BLOOMBERG (May 2, 2017), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-02/orbital-insight-raises-50-million-to-track-economies-
from-space (last visited July 27, 2019). 
 132. Klein and Verhulst, supra note 61, at 12. 
 133. Id.  
 134. Id. 
 135. Id.  
 136. Id. 
 137. Klein and Verhulst, supra note 61, at 12 (“A classic example of such an ecosystem-supporting 
responsibility is a company that contributes data to help improve education, which could eventually improve the 
labour pool from which they hire staff.”); see also Matt Stempeck, Sharing Data is a Form of Corporate 
I - LEV-ARETZ_12 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  6:39 PM 
August 2019] DATA PHILANTHROPY 1513 
5. What Is “Good?” 
Data philanthropy is praised for advancing the greater good through the 
reuse of private-sector data for socially beneficial purposes. But what is good? 
The literature is currently lacking an established comprehensive definition of 
both the descriptive and normative aspects of the public good. Instead, 
commentators have pointed to examples of “good” collaborations and used them 
as case studies. For example, using data to predict dengue fever outbreaks more 
quickly in Pakistan and tracking human migration in Nepal following an 
earthquake are socially beneficial uses of mobile data.138  
Commentators have also proposed categories of social action where data 
has been used for the common good. For example, in one study the authors refer 
to studies of forced migration, disease, poverty and economic stagnation, ethnic 
divisions, and ecological and environmental crises as instances of socially 
beneficial data collaborations.139 Another article identified additional 
application areas, discussing humanitarian crises, global health care and health 
disparities, ecology and global-scale environmental issues, rural development, 
human rights, crime prevention, and child welfare.140 However, these lists are 
illustrative rather than exhaustive and do not provide solid guidelines for 
identifying the “social good” threshold.  
The data philanthropy practice calls for a comprehensive definition of 
social good and a set of concrete guidelines to instruct collaborations. As in other 
areas of the law, devising a definition for what should be considered a social 
good is not only challenging, but also highly context-dependent and entirely 
normative. While such definition is beyond the scope of this Article, it is 
important to note that until a definition is formally constructed, it is up to the 
various stakeholders to characterize a certain undertaking as promoting the 
social good. There are clear social good cases, such as those of established 
humanitarian efforts, and there are borderline cases where the contribution is 
unclear or attenuated. As the decision to donate data involves various 
motivations, among which are commercial profit-maximizing interests, 
controversial characterizations of social good should be scrutinized rigorously.  
6. Reuse Outside the Business Model 
This Article adds an additional illuminating layer to existing definitions of 
data philanthropy: in data philanthropy collaborations, the socially beneficial 
data reuse resides outside the scope of the sharing entity’s business model. This 
addition highlights the difference between socially beneficial data use that is 
integral to a business’s design, and socially beneficial data reuse that is made 
outside the scope of a sharing business’s activity.  
 
Philanthropy, HARV. BUS. REV. (July 24, 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/sharing-data-is-a-form-of-corporate-
philanthropy. 
 138. MOBILE DATA FOR SOCIAL GOOD REPORT, supra note 3, at 7.  
 139. Chandy et al., supra note 47, at 704.  
 140. Niño et al., supra note 105, at 1095.  
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Business use of data-driven insights may be beneficial for consumers141: 
effective ad targeting could mean exposure to more applicable commercial 
content; a useful search engine would rank results based on their relevance to 
the individual consumer; and the use of patient data by hospitals has shown to 
improve monitoring and the accuracy of patient medical histories.142 Business 
use of data-driven insights could also promote public ends. For example, 
Finland-based Enevo optimizes waste collection and recycling by collecting and 
analyzing data from refuse containers around the world.143 While these data uses 
are socially beneficial, none of them qualify as data philanthropy. Data 
philanthropy operates on an incentive system that, while likely to generate 
positive spillover effects on a business reputation or otherwise promote 
commercial interests, is external to the core business model. Offering a socially 
beneficial product or service to a business’s consumers, as well as promoting the 
greater good through for-profit social ventures, produces social value that is 
directed by the design of the commercial enterprise. The laws and social norms 
governing these beneficial uses of data account for their incentives structure. 
Data philanthropy, which looks to extract additional social value outside the 
territory of the sharing entity’s business model, is scrutinized differently based 
on costs, benefits, and the different incentive structure on which it operates.  
This additional requirement not only identifies different incentives in terms 
of a business’s goals and allocation of resources, but also implies the 
involvement of an external party. Data reuses that are not formally contemplated 
could broaden engagement to include external stakeholders. In this sense, the 
additional requirement aligns perfectly with the designated roles of stakeholders 
in data philanthropy: a socially beneficial collaboration between a problem 
holder, a skill holder, and a data holder implicates external parties, which add an 
additional layer of oversight and accountability.  
C. THE CHALLENGES OF DATA PHILANTHROPY  
Data philanthropy is a useful instrument for socially beneficial actions. 
Yet, it raises a variety of challenges, including business risks and individual or 
group injuries that may trigger broader social harm. Four types of risk are 
commonly identified with data philanthropy: costs and competitive 
disadvantage; privacy, security, and ethics; legal constraints; and error and bias 
in private sector data. 
 
 141. See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Secret Consumer Scores and Segmentations: Separating “Haves” from 
“Have-Nots,” 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1411, 1452 (2014); Jessica A. Wood, The Darknet: A Digital Copyright 
Revolution, 16 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 14, 54 (2010); Wullianallur Raghupathi & Viju Raghupathi, Big Data 
Analytics in Healthcare: Promise and Potential, 2 HEALTH INFO. SCI. & SYS. (2014), 
https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4341817/. 
 142. Avi Goldfarb & Catherine Tucker, Privacy and Innovation, 12 INNOVATION POL’Y & ECON. 65, 70 
(2014). 
 143. ENEVO, https://enevo.com/ (last visited July 27, 2019). 
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1. Costs and Competitive Disadvantage 
For many profit-driven, private sector actors, the notion of voluntarily 
sharing privately held data free of charge is largely implausible. Sharing the data, 
or otherwise allowing access to it, exposes the information to security risks, 
human error, and abuse. If the data falls into the hands of a business’ competitor, 
it could quickly result in destructive financial loss. Risking a competitive edge 
without strong evidence of significant gains from the sharing activity makes no 
business sense. Clearly, not all privately-held data sharing generates a similar 
level of risk—the degree of the risk depends on the type of data and how close 
it is to the core confidential segments of a company’s operation.144 But 
sometimes it is the data from which information about a business’s customers or 
strategy can be extracted that is essential for promoting a certain social good. 
Businesses engaging in data philanthropy are also likely to incur costs, like labor 
and setup, none of which can be justified as a core business-related need.145  
2. Privacy, Security, and Ethics 
Many commentators have identified privacy as one of the greatest 
challenges to data philanthropy.146 Data collected by private sector actors often 
contains personal and sensitive details about individuals’ lives, from their 
physical whereabouts and social interactions to their shopping preferences and 
financial standing.147 In some of the sharing models of data philanthropy, 
individuals or entities that were rarely authorized by the data subjects to review 
or analyze their data get access to it.148 A commonly cited concern in this context 
 
 144. Robin et al., supra note 101, at 8. For a discussion of similar concerns in the context of cancer research, 
see Michael Mattioli, The Data-Pooling Problem, 32 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 179, 209–214 (2017). 
 145. Mobile Data for Social Good Report, supra note 3, at 13.  
 146. See, e.g., Silja M. Eckartz et al., A Decision Model for Data Sharing, in ELECTRONIC GOVERNMENT. 
253, 255 (Marjin Janssen et al. eds., 2014) (“In settings where data is shared with or between private 
organizations, most barriers to data sharing are related to privacy or to competition regarding economically 
sensitive data.”); FPF REPORT, supra note 17, at 11 (“Privacy and security were cited as the top concern for 
companies that hold personal data because of the serious risk of re-identification.”); Sean Martin McDonald, 
Ebola: A Big Data Disaster: Privacy, Property, and the Law of Disaster Experimentation, THE CTR FOR 
INTERNET & SOC’Y (2016) (discussing the “marked tension in the debate around experimentation with 
humanitarian technologies and the impact on privacy”); MOBILE DATA FOR SOCIAL GOOD REPORT, supra note 
3, at 14 (citing “[l]ack of common approach to data privacy and risk mitigation associated with data use” as one 
of the main concerns around uses of mobile data for social good); Niño, supra note 105, at 1078 (“Despite the 
growing concern about access to and sharing of personal information, this field lacks a clear and effective 
framework to address legal, ethical and privacy issues related to the use of personal and sensitive data [sic].”); 
Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 6 (“[I]n reality, gaining access to the data is often a formidable challenge 
due to privacy, confidentiality, and security concerns, as well as cross-jurisdictional regulatory incompatibilities 
in how data may be owned and transferred.”). 
 147. See generally Nizan Geslevich Packin & Yafit Lev-Aretz, Big Data and Social Netbanks: Are You 
Ready to Replace Your Bank?, 53 HOUS. L. REV. 1211 (2016) (discussing the expansion of big data companies 
and social network in the financial services market and considering the ramifications of bringing in massive 
troves of consumer data collected in a variety of contexts into the financial context).  
 148. When collection purposes are determined, the scope of the authorization from the user is set. Because 
of the serendipitous nature of data at that point, it’s hard to know which potentially beneficial uses can later 
arise. See discussion in Part IV.  
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is identification of specific individuals and the sensitive information associated 
with them in the shared data.149 Two decades ago, the ultimate technological 
cure for these kinds of privacy concerns was anonymization. Because personal 
data could be stripped of any reference to its subjects, sharing anonymized data 
was considered safe and harmless.150 Anonymization, however, turned out to be 
far from identification-proof. Researchers have repeatedly demonstrated that 
data subjects may be identified from anonymized datasets.151 Stories like that of 
Thelma Arnold, the sixty-two-year-old AOL customer identified by the New 
York Times in anonymized AOL datasets,152 stand as iconic reminders of the 
anonymization failure. Once anonymized data is shared and aggregated, users 
can often be reidentified, either because the patterns of behavior recorded in the 
data are unique to a particular individual or because the anonymized data, when 
combined with external data sources, unveil the identity of its subjects.153  
An alternative technological safeguard for personal information is 
differential privacy, a mathematically-driven solution to reidentification risks.154 
Under this framework, query results are altered by adding noise to the dataset 
and making it difficult to identify individuals with high certainty.155 Even though 
many advocates of differential privacy claim that a well-designed model can 
provide robust anonymization while allowing for rich statistical analysis, some 
argue that this model, too, is not identification-proof.156  
Furthermore, privacy harms materialize not only for individuals, but also 
for groups. Even if the dataset is less granular, identification of demographic 
groups could be risky for these groups, as they can become the target of 
discriminatory or otherwise harmful policies.157  
 
 149. See, e.g., Paul Ohm, Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising Failure of 
Anonymization, 57 UCLA L. REV. 1701, 1744–48 (2010); Mark A. Rothstein, Is Deidentification Sufficient to 
Protect Health Privacy in Research? 10 AM. J. BIOETHICS 3, 5–7 (2010); Ira S. Rubinstein & Woodrow 
Hartzog, Anonymization and Risk, 91 WASH. L. REV. 703, 720 (2016) (discussing the risk of reidentification in 
the course of genetic research); Jane Yakowitz, Tragedy of the Data Commons, 25 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 3–4 
(2011). 
 150. Ohm, supra note 149, at 1716.  
 151. Arvind Narayanan and Vitaly Shmatikov were able to re-identify individuals from an anonymous 
dataset provided by Netflix as part of a contest to improve the company’s movie recommendation engine. See 
Arvind Narayanan & Vitaly Shmatikov, Robust De-anonymization of Large Sparse Datasets, in 2008 PROC. OF 
IEEE SYMP. ON SEC. & PRIVACY 111 (2008).  
 152. Ohm, supra note 149, at 1717; see also Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed for AOL 
Searcher No. 4417749, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/09/technology/ 
09aol.html. 
 153. Ohm, supra note 149, at 1723–25.  
 154. Cynthia Dwork, Differential Privacy, 33 INT’L COLLOQUIUM ON AUTOMATA, LANGUAGES & 
PROGRAMMING, 1 (2006).  
 155. Rubinstein & Hartzog, supra note 149 at 718. 
 156. MOBILE DATA FOR SOCIAL GOOD REPORT, supra note 3, at 16.  
 157. Id. 
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3. Legal Constraints 
In data philanthropy, privacy harms are also tied to the data subject’s 
consent or lack thereof. In some cases, private sector actors cannot share their 
data because their users simply did not agree to the secondary use of the data. 
The repurposing of data, regardless of the socially beneficial motivation behind 
it, does not adhere to the “respect for context” principle, under which data should 
only be used for the purpose for which it was collected.158 In the absence of 
informed consent, all stakeholders also risk violating fundamental autonomy 
principles.159 However, in a world of standard form contracts and online terms 
of service, these cases are somewhat rare, because corporate players often 
stipulate to the use of collected data for very broadly defined purposes.160 As 
many privacy advocates rightly note, this kind of formal consent rarely 
resembles true, clear, and informed consent.161 Most people do not read privacy 
policies and terms of service, with reasons ranging from lack of interest and 
difficulty understanding the legal language, to the time-consuming nature of 
reading those contracts and consumers’ nonexistent bargaining power.162 Users 
are more likely to avoid reading contracts when a great number of consumers 
are bound by the same terms, because they assume that the terms must be 
reasonable.163  
When personal information about the business’s consumers is exposed, 
those individuals or groups suffer an invasion of their privacy that may impose 
emotional, physical and/or economic harm. The sharing business may also be 
subject to harms like: criminal investigations or civil legal liabilities; regulatory 
fines; loss of regulatory licenses or certifications; crucial reputational harm; 
drops in share prices or increases in cost of capital; massive departures of 
existing customers; lower employee recruitment, productivity, and retention; 
and an overall increase in operating expenses.164 Privacy harms may also bring 
down social action actors. Take the case of inBloom, a non-profit organization 
aimed at making student data available for approved third-party applications and 
software for educators.165 The collection and use of personally identifiable 
 
 158. Jane R. Bambauer, All Life Is an Experiment. (Sometimes It Is a Controlled Experiment.), 47 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 487, 490 (2015). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 
1373, 1432–35 (2000); Mayer-Schönberger & Padova, supra note 16, at 322; Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting 
Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033, 1072–74 
(1999); Strandburg, supra note 92, at 142; Richard Warner, Undermined Norms: The Corrosive Effect of 
Information Processing Technology on Informational Privacy, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1047, 1084–86 (2011); Tal 
Zarsky, “Mine Your Own Business!”: Making the Case for the Implications of the Data Mining of Personal 
Information in the Forum of Public Opinion, 5 YALE. J. L. & TECH. 1, 33–34 (2003). 
 161. Privacy Self-Management, supra note 109.  
 162. Packin & Lev-Aretz, supra note 147, at 1279. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 15. 
 165. Id. 
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information about students resulted in a major backlash, and ultimately 
inBloom’s demise.166  
In addition to privacy risks, shared private sector data is subject to 
information security risks. Deficient, outdated or inflexible security protocols 
give rise to data vulnerabilities that could make hacking effortless and may lead 
to negligent leakages.167 In the course of sharing data, as information sometimes 
leaves a business’s servers or as more parties are involved in processing or 
analyzing the data, these risks are exacerbated.  
4. Error and Bias in Private Sector Data 
Another set of informational concerns with respect to data philanthropy is 
the perpetuation of existing inequalities and the creation of new ones due to data 
bias and error. Inaccurate data affects its quality and generates erroneous data 
output. Unofficial data sources can sometimes be decentralized, unstandardized, 
unstructured, and unrepresentative.168 The risk of finding irrelevant or bogus 
correlations with statistical significance is endemic to big datasets, and the 
potential for errors increases greatly when multiple data sets are combined.169 
Furthermore, due to the disparity in worldwide technology proliferation, many 
data sources suffer temporal and spatial restraints, which, if not acknowledged 
appropriately, could result in significant errors.170 
Data can also be incomplete or otherwise non-representative, overlooking 
“data invisibles.”171 The risk of partial representation is mostly common in social 
networking data because, although there are still many individuals that do not 
socially network online, social networking data is widely used for research and 
analyses and assumed to provide a fairly representative sample of the general 
population.172 Errors can also result from alterations to the context and semantics 
of the data in the course of collection or analysis.173  
 
 166. Id.; see also Natasha Singer, InBloom Student Data Repository to Close, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), 
https://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/04/21/inbloom-student-data-repository-to-close/.167.Klein & Verhulst, 
supra note 61, at 15. 
 167. Klein & Verhulst, supra note 61, at 15. 
 168. Robin et al., supra note 101, at 8.  
 169. See Danah Boyd & Kate Crawford, Critical Questions for Big Data: Provocations for a Cultural, 
Technological, and Scholarly Phenomenon, 15 INFO. COMM. & SOC’Y 662, 668 (2012). 
 170. Anwaar Ali et al., Big Data for Development: Applications and Techniques, BIG DATA ANALYTICS, 
July 1, 2016, at 11. 
 171. Klein and Verhulst, supra note 61, at 15. 
 172. Boyd & Crawford, supra note 169, at 669 (“Twitter does not represent ‘all people’, and it is an error 
to assume ‘people’ and ‘Twitter users’ are synonymous: they are a very particular sub-set. Neither is the 
population using Twitter representative of the global population. Nor can we assume that accounts and users are 
equivalent.”). 
 173. A famous example of context-less errors is the multiple contexts of the word “smoking:” “without 
further rules to refine that term, the keyword will retrieve plenty of content about “smoking marijuana,” 
“smoking ribs,” and “smoking hot girls.” See Mark Myslín et al., Using Twitter to Examine Smoking Behavior 
and Perceptions of Emerging Tobacco Products, 15 J. MED. INTERNET RES. (2013); Ashley Sanders-Jackson et 
al., Applying Linguistic Methods to Understanding Smoking-Related Conversations on Twitter, 24 TOBACCO 
CONTROL 136 (2015). 
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In addition to error, all phases of data collection, processing, and use are 
susceptible to human bias.174 Input bias, which stems from biased or lacking 
source data, is a concern for data philanthropy models that facilitate access to 
raw data.175 Some data also goes through a cleaning process, filtering data that 
is deemed “dirty.” Cleaning the data sometimes requires subjective, non-
technical decision-making, which may inject further bias into the data.176 For 
example, a Catholic health system provided a dataset of patient records to the 
U.S. government for cancer research.177 As it turned out, transgendered and 
transsexual patients labeled themselves as being of “UNKNOWN” sex and 
gender, but in-house informaticists imputed or inferred their sex based on other 
available data, such as their height and weight.178  
The risk of bias extends to training and programming as well. Training bias 
results from poor definition of baseline data or inadequate research strategy, 
while programming bias presents itself in the algorithmic design.179 Both can 
lead to misinterpretation of the data and flawed decisional inferences that could 
lead to ineffective, discriminatory, or otherwise harmful actions.  
Importantly, human bias is often unintentional, unconscious, and 
unavoidable: “[e]ven in situations where data miners are extremely careful, they 
can still effect discriminatory results with models that, quite unintentionally, 
pick out proxy variables for protected classes.”180 Flickr’s auto-tagging of black 
men as “animal” or “ape” in users’ photos,181 as well as Google’s targeting 
search results for black-sounding names with ads about criminal activities,182 
 
 174. Kate Crawford & Jason Schultz, Big Data and Due Process: Toward A Framework to Redress 
Predictive Privacy Harms, 55 B.C. L. REV. 93, 99 (2014) (discussing potential instances of discrimination in big 
data predictions); Solon Barocas & Andrew Selbst, Big Data’s Disparate Impact, 104 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 677 
(2016); Danielle Keats Citron, Technological Due Process, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1249, 1262 (2008) (“The biases 
of individual programmers can have a larger, accumulating effect, because, in a complex software system 
composed of smaller subsystems, the actual bias of the system ‘may well be a composite of rules specified by 
different programmers.’”); Citron & Pasquale, supra note 22, at 4 (“Because human beings program predictive 
algorithms, their biases and values are embedded into the software’s instructions, known as the source code and 
predictive algorithms.”); Helen Nissenbaum, How Computer Systems Embody Values, COMPUTER, Mar. 2001, 
at 119 (explaining that seemingly objective systems can generate unfair discrimination). 
 175. See generally Karen R. Chinander and Maurice E. Schweitzer, The Input Bias: The Misuse of Input 
Information in Judgments of Outcomes, 91 ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 243 (2003) 
(describing input bias and its consequences on data).  
 176. Nizan Packin and Yafit Lev-Aretz, Learning Algorithms and Discrimination, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK 
ON THE LAW OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 88, 91 (Woodrow Barfield & Ugo Pagallo eds., 2018).  
 177. Michael Mattioli, Disclosing Big Data, 99 MINN. L. REV. 535, 561 (2014). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Barocas & Selbst, supra note 174, at 683–84 (“Because data mining relies on training data as ground 
truth, when those inputs are themselves skewed by bias or inattention, the resulting system will produce results 
that are at best unreliable and at worst discriminatory.”). 
 180. Id. at 675. 
 181. Alex Hern, Flickr Faces Complaints Over ‘Offensive’ Auto-Tagging for Photos, GUARDIAN (May 20, 
2015), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/may/20/flickr-complaints-offensive-auto-tagging-
photos.  
 182. Lauren Kirchner, When Discrimination Is Baked into Algorithms, ATLANTIC (Sept. 6, 2015), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/09/discrimination-algorithms-disparate-impact/403969/. 
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perfectly demonstrate both the difficulty of warding off biased uses of data and 
how such uses can dangerously reinforce existing stereotypes.  
II. MAKING ROOM FOR DATA PHILANTHROPY 
Responsible data philanthropy can contribute greatly to social causes, to 
the progress of science, to human advancements, and even to saving lives. 
Responsible data philanthropy can also contribute to a more just allocation of 
resources among different groups in society. But the key word here is 
“responsible.” What makes data philanthropy responsible and what role should 
the law play in setting the limits? 
A. DATA PHILANTHROPY: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE  
Data philanthropy currently operates in a legal vacuum. Many questions 
are left open and decided on the go by private sector actors and other 
participants. What guidance should the law provide to distinguish between data 
sharing that promotes the greater good and donations that may end up generating 
more evil than good? How can the law encourage data sharing and, at the same 
time, circumscribe it to prevent risks from materializing ex-ante and to mitigate 
them ex-post?  
Many complex legal and ethical aspects of data philanthropy are ripe for 
exploration. For example, to what extent should the law treat donations of data 
as a charitable contribution for tax breaks? How should the non-rivalry quality 
of data affect the quantification of the donation? Should intellectual property 
protections play a role in reinforcing competitive advantage in data philanthropy 
initiatives? Is data philanthropy a digital age articulation of traditional 
philanthropy? Should the law group data philanthropy with other corporate 
social responsibility initiatives? Are there instances of data sharing for socially 
beneficial purposes that should not be instigated voluntarily but legally 
mandated? Can proprietary interests of data subjects, which have been rejected 
as a basis for intellectual property rights, justify such a mandate for sharing? 
Would data philanthropy be better facilitated through a centralized model in 
which the government plays a democratic oversight role? Should we distinguish 
between in-house corporate research, corporate-funded research, and traditional 
independent academic research? What would such substantive differentiation 
look like? Should a company’s motivation for sharing impact the classification 
of the sharing as data philanthropy? Are acts of data philanthropy that are 
primarily intended to bolster relationships with policymakers any different than 
lobbying? Who can be a legitimate problem holder, skill holder, or data holder? 
How should legal tools prevent data philanthropy from turning into a trump card 
to support unlimited data retention? How can the law minimize bias in data-
driven social insights and mitigate harmful effects ex-post?  
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These are just some of the questions that data philanthropy raises, and 
surely many more will arise over time.183 While future projects might provide 
further guidance on these issues, this Article centers on what many have listed 
as the most pressing challenge to data philanthropy—privacy risks. However, 
before exploring the legal toolkit to find the appropriate legal device for 
reconciling data philanthropy with privacy values, this Article offers a skeptical 
view of the claim that privacy is a considerable legal hindrance to data 
philanthropy.  
B. PRIVACY: A PROBLEM OR A SYMPTOM? 
Most current discussions around data-for-good and data philanthropy pit 
the social benefits from the reuse against various legal risks—primarily 
privacy.184 However, are privacy risks truly interfering with data philanthropy 
in practice? What is it about privacy that stands to stop or limit data philanthropy 
initiatives?  
Before answering this question, it is important to highlight an often-
neglected fact: many socially beneficial data reuses, especially in the context of 
environmental and agricultural initiatives, do not involve human subject data.185 
For example, in 2014, Intel shared data from sensors—located in crops and other 
strategic areas to monitor soil and air moisture levels—with researchers from 
the Earth Research Institute at the University of California.186 Nothing in this 
data set involved human information or risks to individual privacy.  
Nevertheless, most data philanthropy initiatives have specific interest in 
human subject data, an interest which, according to the current sentiment in the 
field, leads to serious privacy risks. In this context, privacy risks could mean 
either the real-life materialization of privacy risks or the legal liability that might 
be attached to their unfolding. In some cases, privacy risks are addressed by 
regulations that ensure adequate protections, while in other cases, privacy harms 
do not give rise to legal liability. For example, the sale of information about 
one’s shopping preferences to third parties is, to many, a privacy-intrusive 
practice, yet it is a common, legally valid transaction facilitated through 
contractual consent. In other words, data philanthropy and privacy might 
conflict in two possible ways: when data philanthropy interferes with 
businesses’ compliance with privacy regulations, or when data philanthropy 
 
 183. For a list of existing guiding legal sources on the data reuse, as well as their limitations in the 
humanitarian context, see U.N. OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, DATA 
RESPONSIBILITY GUIDELINES WORKING DRAFT (2019), https://centre.humdata.org/wp-
content/uploads/2019/03/OCHA-DR-Guidelines-working-draft-032019.pdf.  
 184. See supra Subpart I.C.2.  
 185. For example, Global Forest Watch offers a variety of data and tools to monitor forests. See GLOBAL 
FOREST WATCH, https://www.globalforestwatch.org/.  
 186. Lyndsey Gilpin, How Intel is Using IoT and Big Data to Improve Food and Water Security, 
TECHREPUBLIC (June 13, 2014), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/how-intel-is-using-iot-and-big-data-to-
improve-food-and-water-security/.  
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threatens individuals’ privacy interests, notwithstanding the existence or 
application of a privacy regulatory framework to a given reuse of information. 
Compliance concerns are overstated. A recent report by the Future of 
Privacy Forum has found that, in regulated domains, some companies have 
pointed to privacy regulations as a barrier to sharing information with 
researchers.187 Other companies, whose shared data was covered by privacy 
regulations, reported building regulatory compliance into the sharing process.188 
This discrepancy may imply that privacy compliance costs are sufficiently high 
to disincentivize voluntary sharing for socially beneficial purposes but could 
also indicate that the reference to privacy compliance costs is used to mask other, 
less publicly laudable reasons for non-sharing.189 Furthermore, many data 
markets are not subject to privacy regulations that limit data sharing. In those 
markets, most businesses rely on broadly defined terms of service to allow 
various uses and reuses of the data, and the same could and has been done to 
cover instances of data philanthropy.190  
The difficulties around privacy compliance, therefore, do not seem to 
explain the emphasis on privacy risks constantly voiced in discussions around 
data philanthropy. An alternative possibility could be concerns around privacy 
harms that do not result in legal liability, or where legal risks are secondary to 
the reputational effects of potential privacy harms. Here, too, the voiced 
concerns seem overstated. In virtually all data philanthropy collaborations, 
personally identifiable data is successfully shared with privacy safeguards.191 
Scholars from various academic disciplines have also been engaging in 
proposals for new or improved privacy protections in data-for-good 
exchanges.192 Institutional and structural qualities of stakeholders in data 
 
 187. FPF REPORT, supra note 17, at 11.  
 188. Id. Similarly, BBVA’s Data and Analytics team has shared financial data with the UN Global Pulse to 
measure communities’ resilience after a natural disaster. BBVA shared its customer data in an anonymized and 
aggregated form to comply with national laws and regulations. Press release, BBVA, UN Global Pulse, BBVA 
Announce Partnership and New Project Measuring Economic Resilience to Disasters with Financial Data (Sept. 
13, 2016), https://www.bbva.com/en/un-global-pulse-bbva-announce-partnership-new-project-measuring-
economic-resilience-disasters-financial-data/. 
 189. A similar observation was made in the context of sharing cancer data, “Interestingly, several experts 
suggested that HIPAA provides a plausible excuse for institutions that do not wish to share data for reasons 
unrelated to privacy, such as reputational concerns. This argument is ‘particularly hard to argue with,’ one 
subject stated.” Mattioli, supra note 144, at 209.  
 190. See Data Policy, supra note 16.  
 191. While imperfect, these privacy safeguards include aggregation and anonymization, as well as limited 
access. See for example, the Yale School of Medicine’s Open Data Access (YODA) Project, which facilitates 
the access of researchers and physicians to medical device and anonymized clinical trial data from Johnson & 
Johnson, and Harvard School of Public Health’s malaria tracking research, where phone company Safaricom 
shared de-identified data that was then used to model the travel patterns of cell phone users. Press release, Harv. 
Sch. of Pub. Health, Using Cell Phone Data to Curb the Spread of Malaria (Oct. 11, 2012), 
https://www.hsph.harvard.edu/news/press-releases/cell-phone-data-malaria/. 
 192. See, e.g., Yves-Alexandre de Montjoye et al., Enabling Humanitarian Use of Mobile Phone Data, 
ISSUES IN TECH. INNOVATION, Nov. 2014, at 7–8; Linnet Taylor, The Ethics of Big Data as a Public Good: Which 
Public? Whose Good?, 374 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS ROYAL SOC’Y, Dec. 28, 2016, at 10 (2016); Katherine J. 
Strandburg, Monitoring, Datafication, and Consent: Legal Approaches to Privacy in the Big Data Context, in 
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philanthropy collaborations also often decrease the prospects of unethical 
exploitation of personal information by direct participants. Profit-maximizing 
businesses have their reputation on the line, researchers in academic institutions 
are subject to Institutional Review Board approval and strict ethical research 
standards, and public institutions are committed to promoting the public interest 
in a transparent and accountable manner. 
Voiced concerns around privacy could also be the result of bad rhetoric 
that fails to take into account the complexity around corporate data sharing and 
points to an obvious, relatable concern. In an oft-cited example, the media 
implied that the sharing of mobile data for Ebola tracking purposes was thwarted 
due to privacy hysteria notwithstanding the immense potential social benefit.193 
However, as shown above, data philanthropy involves a number of sharing 
incentives and disincentives, as well as interests of various stakeholders.194 
Pointing to privacy as the only or most pressing impediment to data philanthropy 
is patently wrong. 
As the above discussion shows, data philanthropy involves privacy risks, 
but they can be avoided, minimized, and mitigated. Most importantly, privacy 
risks—in terms of compliance and potential reidentification—are wrongly cited 
as major impediments to data philanthropy. Instead, I argue business and not-
for-profit actors have highlighted privacy concerns for two main reasons: the 
expanding definition of privacy, and the need for legal acknowledgment.  
While many commentators refer to privacy risks, in the context of data 
philanthropy, as risks related to reidentification of data subjects, threats to 
privacy materialize through a variety of information-related risks. Because data 
philanthropy has been explored in various disciplines, the meaning of the term 
privacy has not been uniformly applied. Privacy has acquired a broad meaning 
in the legal, philosophical, and social context: whereas in the past, privacy was 
perceived as the risk of human observation and subsequent judgment,195 over the 
years the term has broadened to include a variety of information-related 
concerns such as error, bias, manipulation, and discrimination.196 While they are 
 
PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD: FRAMEWORKS FOR ENGAGEMENT 1, 25–29 (Julia Lane et al. eds., 
2014).  
 193. Taylor, supra note 192, at 6, 8.  
 194. See supra Subpart II.B.  
 195. Recall Warren and Brandeis’ characterization of the right to privacy as a right to be “let alone” and 
unbothered by other humans, to decide to what extent a person’s “thoughts, sentiments, and emotions shall be 
communicated to others.” Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 
195, 198 (1890). The emphasis on the “others” is crucial. Id. at 199. William Prosser’s formulation of the four 
privacy torts protected only against privacy injuries that incorporate human observation and judgment: (1) public 
disclosure of private facts, (2) intrusion on seclusion, (3) depiction of another in a false light, and (4) 
appropriation of another’s image for commercial gain. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383, 389 
(1960).  
 196. Yafit Lev-Aretz, Privacy and the Human Element (unpublished article) (on file with the author). For 
broader interpretations of the right to privacy see, e.g., Crawford & Schultz, supra note 174; David Gray & 
Danielle Citron, The Right to Quantitative Privacy, 98 MINN. L. REV. 62, 83–87 (2013) (describing how Fourth 
Amendment search and seizure has been narrowed to respond to a broader concept of personal privacy); Mary 
Madden et al., Privacy, Poverty, and Big Data: A Matrix of Vulnerabilities for Poor Americans, 95 WASH. U. L. 
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more nuanced and complex than individual identification, these risks are often 
labeled privacy risks. And these risks may be exacerbated in the complex 
ecosystem of data philanthropy.  
The call to provide a framework for privacy protections in data 
philanthropy not only misidentifies the risks but also the required response. 
What is often called for is not necessarily a framework for balancing 
information-driven risks with social good, but a formal legal acknowledgement 
to signal that data philanthropy follows market standards and social norms and 
is endorsed by governing institutions. In other words, the demand is not for legal 
intervention for the sake of guiding stakeholders on privacy matters; it is a 
demand for legal intervention for the sake of legal recognition of data 
philanthropy. Privacy, in this context, provides an easily identified tool for legal 
recognition.  
The legal guidance offered in the next Parts will address some of the 
broader informational problems that the term privacy represents as well as the 
lack of legal acknowledgement. After analyzing the current legal landscape, this 
Article hones in on the FIPs as the best-suited legal lever for providing both an 
acknowledgement of and guidance on informational risks in data philanthropy.  
C. CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE  
Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights protects 
individuals from arbitrary interference with their privacy and calls for 
establishing legal protections against such interferences.197 Around the world, 
legal systems have translated this abstract commitment into real-life legal 
interventions through a variety of privacy protections at different conceptual and 
practical levels. In the United States, these laws, regulations, and policies are 
derived from separate, overlapping authorities—state and federal statutory laws, 
agency regulations, industry best practices, and private contractual 
agreements.198 
Federal privacy law lacks comprehensive legislation that addresses 
informational privacy across all industries. Instead, privacy protection in the 
commercial sphere is applied and enforced through a sectoral approach.199 
Commonly, these laws are narrowly customized to specific categories of data in 
specific industries or practices. Examples include the Telecommunications 
 
REV. 53, 64–67 (2017) (discussing the disparate treatment poorer communities experience in relation to privacy 
risks and concerns); Theodore Rostow, What Happens When an Acquaintance Buys Your Data?: A New Privacy 
Harm in the Age of Data Brokers, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 667, 676–69 (2017) (describing statutory privacy 
protections in the commercial sphere in response to consumers’ broader definition of privacy). 
 197. G.A. Res 217 (III) A, Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 198. Rostow, supra note 196, at 676.  
 199. See, e.g., DANIEL J. SOLOVE & PAUL SCHWARTZ, INFORMATION PRIVACY LAW 792–94 (5th ed. 2015); 
Michael C. James, A Comparative Analysis of the Right to Privacy in the United States, Canada, and Europe, 
29 CONN. J. INT’L L. 257, 260 (2014); Omer Tene, Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis: A Critical Assessment of the 
Second Wave of Global Privacy Laws, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 1217, 1217 (2013) [hereinafter Privacy Law’s Midlife 
Crisis]. 
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Act,200 the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),201 The Health Information 
Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA),202 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 
(GBLA),203 the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA),204 and the 
Electronic Communications Privacy Act (ECPA).205  
Federal agencies have also been involved in privacy rulemaking. For 
example, in 2016, the Federal Communications Commission passed a set of 
landmark privacy protections for internet users—now repealed206—requiring 
ISPs to disclose information collection practices and obtain consumers’ consent 
for the selling of that information.207 The Federal Trade Commission, which is 
authorized to target “unfair or deceptive acts or practices,”208 has no rulemaking 
authority. It nevertheless has been active on the privacy front through issuing 
numerous privacy complaints against private sector actors and entering consent 
decrees with corporate players like Facebook and Snapchat over unfair privacy 
practices.209  
There are also theoretical, general, and non-binding policies to guide the 
collection and use of personal information. One such source is the FIPs, a set of 
widely accepted principles listing protections for personal information. The FIPs 
were first introduced in a report by the advisory committee to the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare in 1973, in response to the growing use of data 
banks and other recordkeeping systems storing and processing personal 
information.210 The report prescribed a list of fair information principles, 
including transparency, use limitation, access and correction, data quality, and 
 
 200. Under the Telecommunications Act, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) may not use, disclose, or permit 
access to identifiable customer network information for purposes outside the provision of the services from 
which the information is derived. 47 U.S.C.A. § 222(c)(1) (West 2017).  
 201. The FCRA establishes certain duties for consumer reporting agencies and affords protections for 
personal credit information. Fair Credit Reporting Act, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 601, 84 Stat. 1114, 1128 (1970) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).  
 202. HIPAA imposes obligations on doctors and medical services when handling their patients’ data. Health 
Information Portability and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as 
amended in scattered sections of 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.). 
 203. The GBLA regulates data practices in financial services. Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, Pub. L. No. 106-
102, 113 Stat. 1338 (1999) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 & 15 U.S.C.).  
 204. FERPA institutes fair information practices in the education sector. Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2012). 
 205. Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).  
 206. Brian Fung, The House Just Voted to Wipe Away the FCC’s Landmark Internet Privacy Protections, 
WASH. POST (Mar. 28, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-switch/wp/2017/03/28/the-house-
just-voted-to-wipe-out-the-fccs-landmark-internet-privacy-protections/?utm_term=.83b93df4d869.  
 207. Press Release, Federal Communications Commission, FCC Adopts Privacy Rules to Give Broadband 
Consumers Increased Choice, Transparency and Security for Their Personal Data (Oct. 27, 2016), 
https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-adopts-broadband-consumer-privacy-rules.  
 208. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 45, 52 (West 2017). 
 209. Daniel J. Solove & Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. 
L. REV. 583, 600, 610 (2014). 
 210. U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS: 
REPORT OF THE SECRETARY’S ADVISORY COMM. ON AUTOMATED PERSONAL DATA SYSTEMS (1973).  
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security. Over time, different constructions of the FIPs have been articulated and 
incorporated into a number of data protection regimes around the world.211  
The most important and oft-cited restatement of the FIPs is the Guidelines 
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data, 
published by the OECD in 1980.212 The OECD Guidelines specify eight fair 
information principles:213 
The Collection Limitation Principle limits the collection of personal data, 
calling for it to be obtained by lawful and fair means with the knowledge or 
consent of the data subject.  
The Data Quality Principle requires that collected data be relevant to the 
purposes for which it will be used and is accurate, complete, and kept up-to-date. 
The Purpose Specification Principle entails ex-ante specification of the 
collection purposes.  
The Use Limitation Principle prohibits the disclosure or use of data for 
purposes other than those specified at the time of collection unless the consent 
of the data subject has been obtained, or the disclosure or use is required by the 
authority of law.  
The Security Safeguards Principle ensures that reasonable security 
safeguards to personal data are in place. 
The Openness Principle demands transparency about data collection 
practices and policies including the main purposes of the data use and the 
identity and location of the data controller. 
The Individual Participation Principle gives individuals the right to know 
which data is collected about them; to access the data within a reasonable time, 
in a reasonable manner, and in a readily intelligible form; and to challenge the 
data and have inaccurate data erased, rectified, completed, or amended. 
The Accountability Principle requires that data collectors be accountable 
for complying with the principles stated in the guidelines.  
In addition to being governed by federal and state statutes and the soft-law 
provided by the FIPs, the collection and use of personal information is also 
governed by contracts. This is largely because both legal and FIPs protection of 
information privacy place a crucial emphasis on individuals’ consent as 
legitimizing “nearly any form of collection, use, or disclosure of personal 
 
 211. Gellman, supra note 27, at 1.  
 212. ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD GUIDELINES ON THE 
PROTECTION OF PRIVACY AND TRANSBORDER FLOWS OF PERSONAL DATA (1980) [hereinafter OECD 
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DEPT. OF HOMELAND SECURITY, PRIVACY POLICY GUIDANCE MEMORANDUM (2008), 
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/privacy/privacy_policyguide_2008-01.pdf; FED. TRADE COMM’N, 
PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR BUSINESSES AND 
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recommendations-businesses-policymakers. 
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data.”214 As a result, private sector actors can and often do, include broad data 
collection purposes in their terms of service.215 Users, who rarely read the terms 
of service that they agree to, formally accept these stipulations, which in practice 
act to legally legitimize repurposing of collected data. As argued above, with 
consent-based privacy protection, such stipulations often allow data sharing 
relatively immune to legal risk.  
III. DATA PHILANTHROPY AND THE FIPS 
Current legal protections of privacy have allowed for many instances of 
data philanthropy. Indeed, without statutory or regulatory attention, data 
philanthropy is mostly governed by contractual agreements that may authorize 
data sharing for socially beneficial purposes. Why not leave the specifics of data 
philanthropy to data collectors and users? After all, some users willingly agree 
to responsible and safe sharing of personal information about themselves for 
socially beneficial causes, and it is safe to assume that most people, when 
presented with the opportunity to share data in a responsible manner, would 
agree as well.216 Why should the law interfere further if it currently allows data 
philanthropy to exist?  
The answer is that the law allows data philanthropy to exist, but nothing 
more. Despite a growing interest in the utilization of data-for-good and many 
examples of data philanthropy that have benefited societies around the world, 
the legal community lags behind. There are no works on how data giving can be 
done responsibly, no discussions of the practical outcomes of engaging in data 
philanthropy, no explorations of various sharing structures and players, and no 
guidance that could both incentivize safe sharing and make it safer. 
The contractually manageable state of data philanthropy has contributed to 
the current legal vacuum. But another plausible reason for this relative silence 
on the legal front could be the struggle that many privacy scholars encounter 
when trying to think seriously about data philanthropy. After all, in a culture of 
constant surveillance, endless data collection, monetization of personal 
information, and little respect for privacy, it feels normatively uncomfortable to 
discuss the legal facilitation of beneficial uses of this “dirty” data. To borrow 
from another legal discipline, this data has the appearance of the fruit of a very 
poisonous tree.217 The term philanthropy, which is very appealing to the private 
 
 214. Privacy Self-Management, supra note 109, at 1880; see also Lisa M. Austin, Enough About Me: Why 
Privacy Is About Power, Not Consent (or Harm), in A WORLD WITHOUT PRIVACY: WHAT LAW CAN AND 
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Information Practices, 76 MD. L. REV. 952, 964–66 (2017); Privacy Law’s Midlife Crisis, supra note 199, at 
1218–19. 
 215. Data Policy, supra note 16, and accompanying text.  
 216. See Subpart I.A (listing examples of individual data philanthropy). 
 217. Under the exclusionary rule, if primary evidence in a criminal case was illegally obtained and is thus 
tainted, then all evidence derived from it may be subject to the same flaw as they are all fruits of the same 
poisonous tree. See Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 340 (1939); United States v. Hernandez, 670 F.3d 
616, 620 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v. Galaviz, 645 F.3d 347, 354 (6th Cir. 2011). 
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sector, is condemned and rejected by many privacy advocates. How, they ask, 
can data that was lawfully but often immorally obtained and used be re-
channeled as a charitable form of giving?  
These concerns are understandable, and the intuitions behind them are 
valid. They cannot, however, stand in the face of a scholarly investigation of and 
normative work on data philanthropy. By leaving data philanthropy unexplored 
we fail to increase social value: fighting to limit immoral collection practices is 
socially desirable, but socially beneficial reuses of private sector data are equally 
so. We should use an alternative effective term to replace “philanthropy,” we 
should disapprove of immoral information practices, and we must fight for a 
better privacy-protecting future. At the same time, we must acknowledge that 
information that has already been collected can be effectively reused for socially 
beneficial causes. This data languishes in servers while it could be repurposed 
to advance research and promote humanitarian causes. Ignoring this data 
because we disagree with the way it was obtained or used is the worst of all 
worlds—it does not prevent future damage or mitigate existing harms, and it 
leaves independent academic views outside the ongoing discussion about a 
working definition of responsible data philanthropy.  
Data philanthropy raises important legal questions that are being answered 
offhand, on a case-by-case basis without the proper involvement of legal 
scholars and those who are affected by these decisions. The latter group is bound 
by contracts of adhesion that are rarely read, never negotiated, and which make 
these unpremeditated decisions around data philanthropy into an approved legal 
standard. A legal academic discussion of data philanthropy must take place and 
must, for the most part, be done independently of concurrent advocacy and 
policy efforts to stop harmful information practices. Extreme cases of highly 
illegitimate information practice combined with a pressing social need would 
require balancing work, but as a general rule, we should attempt to keep 
questions about the legitimacy of the collection and the legitimacy of the reuse 
utterly separate. The fact that data is used for a socially beneficial purpose does 
not immunize its collection and use from being challenged on moral, ethical, and 
legal grounds. At the same time, data that has already been collected should not 
be off-limits for socially beneficial uses merely because it was obtained 
illegitimately. 
This Article advocates for a data philanthropy exception to the FIPs. In the 
next Subsections, it explains why the FIPs are currently the best-suited channel 
for the legal governance of data philanthropy, and why broad interpretation 
cannot achieve the same purpose as a designated exception. This Article 
concludes by proposing a general framework for legal checks on privacy 
protection in data philanthropy through the FIPs. 
A. WHY THE FIPS? 
Data philanthropy could be legally tackled through legislative reform. 
However, three objections loom large. First, designing statutory tools require a 
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deep and comprehensive understanding of the data philanthropy universe and 
the various challenges that the law has to address. Data philanthropy, however, 
is a relatively young phenomenon. While there are many examples of socially 
beneficial data sharing, they are diffused across different data holders, skill 
holders, and problem holders, various levels of exigency, and diverse social 
benefits. Put differently, because data philanthropy is nascent and administered 
impromptu, further study and experimentation is required before prescribing 
rigid guidelines through legislation.  
Second, privacy could be potentially undermined in the legislative process 
because of pressure from interest groups. As the public choice theory proposes 
and as history confirms, the lawmaking process implicates organized interest 
groups who strive to promote their agenda.218 The resulting legislative product 
is determined by relative group strength—the group with most political capital 
commonly exercises superior influence on the lawmaking process.219 In the 
context of privacy, public choice concerns are exacerbated. Devoting special 
legislation to address data philanthropy would bundle privacy together with 
other data-giving issues in a manner that could prevent appropriate balancing. 
Privacy has failed as a policy goal because of similar bundling in the past, which 
has framed privacy as an individual interest that has to bend in the face of 
societal objectives.220  
Third, federal legislation is costly, could take years to complete, and cannot 
be updated promptly. To turn a bill into law, several stages of internal 
consideration must come to pass: legislators in congressional committees must 
approve the proposal, which must then be discussed in hearings, examined in 
debates, approved by majorities in both houses of Congress, and then either 
approved by the President or supported by a veto-override in both houses.221 
State legislation would likely entail shorter and less complex processes, but 
would still involve significant costs and time to finalize. Furthermore, state 
legislation invites an additional ground for challenge—that of different legal 
treatments and lack of harmonization across jurisdictions.  
This is not to say that data philanthropy should be exempted from statutory 
governance. In the future, comprehensive uniform or sectoral legislation is likely 
to offer better facilitation of data philanthropy. But in the current political 
climate around privacy and data-for-good uses, and with data philanthropy in its 
 
 218. Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private 
Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 203, 213-16 (2013) [hereinafter Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Public 
Choice]. 
 219. Id. 
 220. PRISCILLA M. REGAN, LEGISLATING PRIVACY 22-23 (1995) (“The policy process began with an 
emphasis on the value of privacy, and much of the policy debate was framed in terms of an individual interest 
— privacy — in conflict with a societal interest — government efficiency, law enforcement, and an honest work 
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the defensive because those alleging a privacy invasion bore the burden of proving that a certain activity did 
indeed invade privacy and that the individual privacy interest was more important than the societal interest.”). 
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I - LEV-ARETZ_12 (TRANSMIT) (DO NOT DELETE) 8/7/2019  6:39 PM 
1530 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 70:1491 
early stages of development, public legislation is unlikely to quickly and 
effectively materialize. While less ideal, devising initial intervention in data 
philanthropy through the combination of industry self-regulation and soft-law 
levers would be more realistically achievable at this point. Specifically, a data 
philanthropy exception to the FIPs would act as a subtle form of intervention to 
both limit instances of risky data sharing and incentivize responsible data 
philanthropy. 
The FIPs are not without problems. Privacy scholars have had a “love-
hate” relationship with the FIPs since their inception because, as Professor 
Woodrow Hartzog stated, “[w]hile the FIPs have been remarkably useful, they 
have painted us into a corner.”222 Since their early days, the FIPs have been 
widely criticized for their substance and for the way in which they have been 
implemented.223 The FIPs were regarded as efficiency principles that sought 
better functioning and fairer (but not necessarily fair) information systems 
without providing true privacy protection in the age of ubiquitous 
surveillance.224 Not only have the FIPs not contributed to a more privacy-
respecting culture, but they have, in fact, worsened the state of privacy because 
they give the illusion of protection while laundering surveillance through 
formalistic compliance.225 The FIPs terms, preoccupied as they are with 
individuals’ consent, can legitimize destructive information collection 
practices.226  
In addition to these commonly voiced critiques, Hartzog points to other, 
less discussed complaints about the FIPs, such as their limited scope that 
overlooks the effect of design signals and transaction costs on trust, obscurity 
and autonomy.227 The FIPs also neglect an important set of relationships in the 
age of networks and double-sided markets—that of information 
intermediaries228—and seem to be detached from humans’ susceptibility to 
manipulation and the extent to which information, in the hands of those who 
wish to manipulate individual choice, can be a dangerous tool.229 Similarly, 
automated decision-making represents a blind spot for the FIPs, which do not 
attend to the structural problems of automated systems, which include bias, 
discrimination, and the mistaken perception that humanly created automated 
systems generate objective facts.230  
 
 222. Hartzog, supra note 214, at 953. 
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 224. Id. (referencing JAMES RULE ET AL., THE POLITICS OF PRIVACY 93 (1980)). 
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The FIPs also place a crucial emphasis on users’ control. This emphasis, 
however, fails to empower users to make informed decisions about the flow of 
their personal information, and instead leaves them “bewildered, hopeless, and 
agreeable to anything.”231 Control does not scale and individuals cannot 
reasonably exercise the control they get through notice and consent models—
reading all the terms of service and privacy policies that people are bound by in 
today’s information economy is virtually impossible.232 Even when people do 
read and have a good sense of their rights and obligations, they feel helpless in 
the face of corporate power and their inability to opt-out.233 And as the FIPs 
continue to promote the control fixation in privacy practice, other important 
principles are forsaken and disused.234  
Indeed, the FIPs have many shortcomings. And many of their flaws are 
heightened because of the FIPs’ established standing and the fact that privacy 
policy, at this point, cannot do without them.235 But this is exactly why they are 
the best place to start addressing issues around data philanthropy. Here, too, we 
must keep exploring to find the optimal regime to promote more transparency, 
accountability, and an appropriate mixture of privacy by design and user control. 
Improvements to the FIPs do not nullify the criticism they have rightly received. 
But against the backdrop of poor alternatives and the particular virtues of the 
FIPs that could adequately address some of the unique qualities of data 
philanthropy, they currently represent the best legal home for data philanthropy.  
A legal intervention in data philanthropy should promote everything that 
the FIPs stand for: respect for privacy, pragmatism, a global focus, and sufficient 
open-endedness to allow jurisdictions to study data philanthropy and implement 
the legal administration of it as they see fit. As Hartzog rightly points out, the 
FIPs are “the closest thing the world has to a universal privacy touchstone.”236 
Even though overreliance on the FIPs has led to many problems, the FIPs remain 
prevalent.237 Their pragmatic nature, and their influence over information 
practices around the world, has turned the FIPs into an essential tool in the 
globalization of privacy policy.238 The FIPs have similarly served to harmonize 
states’ legislation in the United States and inspire across-the-board privacy 
standards in the industry.239 Currently, anyone who speaks about privacy uses 
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some variation of the FIPs language. For data philanthropy to be guided in a 
privacy-respecting direction and concurrently incentivized to spread, a data 
philanthropy exception would be best introduced through this common and 
established model of fair information practices.  
Before becoming the bedrock of information privacy protection, the FIPs 
had to make a choice between several competing notions of privacy. Among 
these competing notions, privacy as control prevailed in the FIPs, a choice that 
many have lamented and criticized—rightly, for the most part—for its 
unraveling effect on the state of privacy.240 Still, for informational privacy to be 
practically administrated, a choice had to be made and maintained over time. 
Thanks to this choice, the FIPs could propose measures of privacy protection 
that, while lacking in many senses, still offer more than mere intuition and 
bolster other privacy values such as autonomy and fairness.241 
One of the commonly cited reasons for the FIPs’ longevity is their 
flexibility. The FIPs were first introduced at a time when big data, smartphones, 
artificial intelligence, and mass surveillance were the exclusive domain of 
science fiction.242 Since then, all of these technologies and phenomena have 
become a reality, and the FIPs still bear relevance in the face of these dramatic 
changes. The FIPs’ technology neutrality and timelessness are strongly linked 
to their reliance on open-ended principles. Adhering to some basic principles of 
information privacy in the abstract, the FIPs model is one of standards rather 
than rules.243 They thus inspire new regulatory proposals and animate a 
piecemeal development of privacy protection.244 New information practices like 
data philanthropy require both sufficient breathing room for development and 
high-level guidance for spread and growth. The FIPs’ elasticity is thus crucial 
for guaranteeing privacy protection that could respond and be better tailored to 
future technological, legal, and social changes. The high-level articulation of the 
FIPs not only allows, but also entails, further deliberation over the details in 
specific contexts.  
A data philanthropy exception to the FIPs would provide much needed 
guidance and instigate a scholarly conversation about the appropriate governing 
rules for responsible data sharing. Such exception would also act to reinforce the 
FIPs by acknowledging a domain in which some of these principles must be 
waived or partially enforced. The inclusion of a data philanthropy exception in 
a set of established, widely-accepted, and cross-jurisdictional privacy standards 
would increase the visibility of data philanthropy. The data philanthropy 
exception would introduce the possibility of engaging in responsible data 
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sharing with smaller private sector actors who may not have been aware of data 
philanthropy, or who have been aware but were deterred by its lack of legal 
acknowledgment.  
B. BROADER INTERPRETATION VERSUS AN EXCEPTION 
Of the different values of the FIPs, the purpose specification principle—
requiring ex-ante particularization of collection purposes—as well as the use 
limitation principle—allowing disclosure or use of collected information only 
for those specified purposes—are mostly at odds with data philanthropy.245 Both 
purposes necessitate ex-ante stipulation of specific uses to guide collection and 
use activities, while data philanthropy relies on repurposing already-collected 
data. In light of this conflict, guiding data philanthropy through the FIPs means 
that data philanthropy either must be incorporated into the FIPs as an exception 
to these principles or that the FIPs must be interpreted broadly to legitimize data 
philanthropy.  
Because the purpose specification and use limitation principles aim to 
provide a framework for treatment of users’ data that meets individuals’ 
expectations, it makes sense to argue that a broader interpretation of the FIPs 
should acknowledge a spectrum of socially beneficial repurposes to which users 
would normally agree. Where the social benefit is significant and the privacy 
risk is low or non-existent, most individuals, if asked, would agree to repurpose 
collected information about themselves for the greater good.246 Such 
constructive agreement is entirely within the realm of reasonable interpretations 
of the FIPs, as they constantly engage in balancing privacy with other values and 
aligning privacy practices with privacy expectations.  
However, the interpretative approach suffers a number of weaknesses that 
cloud its appealing merits. First, data philanthropy is compatible with the themes 
of the FIPs but is greatly antithetical to the purpose specification and use 
limitation principles. Reconciliation of those principles with data philanthropy 
requires a broad interpretation to the point of overriding the language prohibiting 
unauthorized reuse. Applying such broad interpretation could set a precarious 
precedent leading to similarly broad readings of the FIPs in other contexts and 
effectively eroding the protections they grant. Second, a designated 
interpretation-based exception for data philanthropy would exacerbate existing 
inconsistencies between different versions of the FIPs. The informal application 
of the FIPs to data philanthropy is likely to be mapped out differently around the 
globe. Opening the door to such broad interpretation could also result in similar 
moves in other contexts, curtailing the common ground of different versions of 
the FIPs and making the FIPs less effective as a common set of guiding 
principles. Third, opting for an interpretative approach would make the already 
decentralized FIPs even more decentralized. An interpretative accommodation 
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of data philanthropy, unlike formal amendments, delegates the rulemaking 
power to private sector actors, who strategize their policy internally according 
to their business interests. Different preferences of different private actors are 
certain to produce significantly different interpretative exceptions and 
applications. However, such broad interpretation of the FIPs is unlikely to take 
place to begin with, because a significant departure from market standards as 
prescribed by the established language of the FIPs exposes businesses to 
heightened legal liability. Only dominant market players can afford a risk of 
legal liability of this magnitude, and only adoption by a sufficient number of 
market actors would make the interpretation-based exception an entrenched 
standard. Furthermore, policy strategies around data philanthropy may not be 
appropriately communicated at scale to guide smaller market players in their 
data collaborations, even if an interpretation-based exception gains sufficient 
traction to be considered a market standard from a legal perspective. And, lastly, 
integrating a constructive agreement into the FIPs is especially dangerous in the 
privacy context. Traditionally viewed as an individual right, privacy has 
commonly yielded to other societal interests such as safety and efficiency.247 An 
interpretative approach that construes individual consent in the name of the 
greater good without guaranteeing a broad and informed perspective, as well as 
offering a contextual strategy for the application of the exception, ignores the 
social value of the privacy right.248 The social value of data philanthropy cannot 
be overstated, but neither can the social value of privacy, which risks being 
degraded in the absence of a clear formalization of data philanthropy.  
A formal data philanthropy exception might also suffer a number of flaws. 
First, the FIPs are commonly praised for their flexibility and global nature, but 
these benefits lessen the possibility of amending them. At the moment, several 
institutions have offered their non-statutory versions of the FIPs, including the 
OECD and the Canadian Standards Association outside the U.S.; and, the 
Federal Trade Commission, the Department of Homeland Security, and the 
Department of Health and Human Services in the U.S.249 The most influential 
and oft-cited account is the OECD version of the FIPs, which since its 
introduction in 1980, has been revised once in 2013 to reflect twenty-three years 
of changes in international privacy activities, privacy laws, and privacy 
policy.250 Although data philanthropy theoretically could be introduced into 
future revisions of the OECD frameworks, given that it has been only a few years 
since the sole revision, it is unclear when such revision might happen again. 
Second, assuming that the data philanthropy exception would not be added to all 
versions of the FIPs concurrently, the risk of shrinking the common ground of 
the different FIPs versions remains. Third, like the interpretative exception, the 
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formal data philanthropy exception could end up inviting additional exceptions 
that may interfere with the FIPs generality and weaken their protections.  
Nevertheless, a formal data philanthropy exception could successfully 
reconcile the purpose specification and use limitation principles within the 
democratic oversight of a public institution. A formal amendment would involve 
a broad, informed perspective, attention to diverse interests including those of 
underrepresented groups, and a comprehensive consideration of the societal 
risks and benefits. Unlike the interpretation-based exception that is conceived 
internally by private sector actors, the process of formally accommodating data 
philanthropy in the FIPs includes institutional assurances of fairness, 
transparency, and accountability. Governmental public institutions are in a 
unique position to adopt a data philanthropy exception because many of them 
can engage the public as well as a wide array of stakeholders in the amendment 
process. Specifically in the United States, a number of public institutions have 
already engaged in discussions about the FIPs and their application to changing 
technological and social realities, including the Federal Trade Commission,251 
the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services,252 the Department of 
Homeland Security,253 and the Department of Commerce.254 Importantly, some 
of the U.S. versions do not impose any purpose specification and/or use 
limitation requirements. For these versions, the data philanthropy exception 
should be added, not as an exception, but as an additional clause or clarification 
to instruct private sector players in sharing corporate data for the social good. A 
federal agency or governmental department’s formal acknowledgment of data 
philanthropy under the FIPs could stir a global and local conversation and 
eventually contribute to tailored regulation of data philanthropy.  
C. A DATA PHILANTHROPY EXCEPTION TO THE FIPS  
Scholars have both lauded and criticized the FIPs—often in the same 
breath.255 This ambivalence is easily understood: the FIPs have been an 
indispensable part of privacy policy, but they have also exhibited many 
weaknesses within their scope, which, in the face of new technologies, seems 
too narrow. Consequently, scholars have advocated rethinking the FIPs 
internally and externally, recommending improvements to the language of the 
FIPs and suggesting complements outside of them.256 The proposal submitted 
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here is similar in the sense that it commences by advancing an internal 
modification to the FIPs that will mirror the FIPs’ idiosyncratic qualities—a 
standardized, general, and flexible exception. At the same time, this Article calls 
for further studies of data philanthropy to reevaluate strategies internal to the 
FIPs and sow seeds for future legal intervention through mechanisms external 
to the FIPs.  
Because the purpose specification and use limitation principles stand to 
prohibit instances of data reuse without authorization, data philanthropy should 
be introduced as an exception to these principles. The purpose specification and 
use limitation principles instruct data handlers to have a clear and articulated 
vision of their collection motivation and to limit the use of collected data to those 
stated purposes only. Any use outside the scope of the initial purposes 
necessitates additional or updated consent. As the above discussion has 
repeatedly emphasized, consent provides a legal way to engage in data 
philanthropy.257 However, contractual consent should not be designated as the 
sole path to legitimate data reuse. This strategy further incentivizes overbroad 
contractual stipulations that make the purpose specification ineffective because 
broad terms can cover a huge universe of uses. As some socially beneficial uses 
cannot be anticipated, consent also increases transaction costs that can frustrate 
data philanthropy. Ex-ante consent can also have chilling effects and 
compromise the authenticity of human behavior, thus spoiling data-driven 
research.258 Consent is widely criticized for being ineffective in driving true 
participation of the data subject in the decision-making process.259 In other 
words, consent, as mandated through the purpose specification and use 
limitation principles, imposes barriers to data philanthropy in the name of an 
unachievable ideal.  
An effective data philanthropy exception should promote three ends. First, 
it should provide meaningful guidance to industry players who have already 
engaged in data philanthropy initiatives, helping them differentiate between 
different uses, different purposes, different levels of privacy risks, and different 
social-good justifications for reuse. Second, it should signal to players that have 
yet to join the collaborative efforts that they, too, could donate their data 
responsibly for socially beneficial purposes. Third, a data philanthropy 
exception hosted in one of the formal versions of the FIPs would stir a global 
 
Brookman, Protecting Privacy in an Era of Weakening Regulation, 9 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 355 (2015); Nikhil 
S. Palekar, Privacy Protection: When Is “Adequate” Actually Adequate?, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 549, 567 
(2008); Privacy Self-Management, supra note 109, at 1884–85. 
 257. See supra Subpart III.B. 
 258. Graham Crow et al., Research Ethics and Data Quality: The Implications of Informed Consent, 9 INT’L 
J. SOC. RES. METHODOLOGY, 83 (2006) (examining approaches of research governance and their effects on the 
quality of the data collected); Lloyd Lueptow et al., The Impact of Informed Consent Regulations on Response 
Rate and Response Bias, 6 SOC. METHODS & RES., 183 (1977); Eleanor Singer, Informed Consent: Consequences 
for Response Rate and Response Quality in Social Surveys, 43 AM. SOC. REV. 144 (1978).  
 259. See, e.g., James Grimmelmann, Saving Facebook, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1137, 1181–82 (2009); Julie E. 
Cohen, Privacy, Ideology, and Technology: A Response to Jeffrey Rosen, 89 GEO. L.J. 2029 (2001) (showing 
how current consent models are largely meaningless). 
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discussion around data philanthropy—a conversation that would contribute to a 
more detailed operationalization in the future.  
A possible construction of the exception could resemble the EU General 
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) treatment of socially beneficial data 
reuse.260 Having taken effect in May 2018, the GDPR mandates its own purpose 
specification and use limitation rules: Collection of personal data must be 
conducted for “specified, explicit, and legitimate purposes” and any further 
processing of collected information must be compatible with those purposes.261 
Unlike the FIPs, the GDPR offers an exception for the further processing of 
personal data for the performance of tasks carried out in the public interest, 
including archiving purposes, scientific and historical research purposes, or 
statistical purposes.262 These purposes are not considered incompatible with the 
original processing purposes.263 According to Article 89, further processing for 
one of those purposes is subject to appropriate safeguards for the rights and 
freedoms of the data subject to technical and organizational measures.264 Article 
89 also allows Member States to come up with appropriate statutory derogations 
from some rights set by the GDPR, when those rights “seriously impair the 
achievement of” those purposes and the derogations “are necessary” for their 
fulfillment.265 
A data philanthropy exception could be similarly comprised of purposes in 
the public interest (for example, research, journalism, and healthcare) and 
outline distinct rules for each category. The GDPR categories seem reasonable 
at first. Even the fiercest privacy advocates would agree that in some cases, 
privacy must step back and be balanced against societal values like public health, 
law enforcement, national security, economic efficiency, and environmental 
protection.266 Nevertheless, the GDPR approach fails to provide sufficient 
context for the balancing mission. The GDPR instructs Member States to 
interpret “processing for scientific research purposes” broadly to include, for 
example, “technological development and demonstration, fundamental research, 
 
 260. Council Regulation 2016/679, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 Apr. 2016 on the 
Protection of Natural Persons with Regard to the Processing of Personal Data and on the Free Movement of 
Such Data and Repealing Council Directive 95/46/EC, 2016 O.J. (L 119) 1 [hereinafter GDPR].  
 261. Id. at art. 5(1)(b).  
 262. Id.; see also recital 50. 
 263. Id. 
 264. Id. at art. 89(1). This clause emphasizes data minimization as one of the end goals of the safeguards. 
By so doing, it directly links the original collection with the secondary possessing of the information, a logic 
that is criticized here. It also highlights de-identification of the data subjects as an appropriate safeguard: “Those 
measures may include pseudonymization provided that those purposes can be fulfilled in that manner. Where 
those purposes can be fulfilled by further processing which does not permit or no longer permits the identification 
of data subjects, those purposes shall be fulfilled in that manner.” By so doing, it ignores broader risks associated 
with generating collective knowledge, as outlined in infra Subpart III.C.1.  
 265. See GDPR, supra note 260, at art. 89(2) (explaining scientific or historical research purposes or 
statistical purposes); see also id. at art. 89(3) (explaining) archiving purposes in the public interest). 
 266. See generally Regan, supra note 220 (explaining that, while privacy has to step back in the face of 
other interests, we rarely see other interests stepping back to protect privacy).  
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applied research and privately funded research.”267 The definition of statistical 
purposes is similarly broad and covers “any operation of collection and the 
processing of personal data necessary for statistical surveys or for the production 
of statistical results.”268 By so doing, the GDPR ignores institutional differences 
and groups together uses with varying degrees of social-good justifications for 
the processing of all personal data, regardless of the different privacy risks they 
pose. 
As an alternative, this Article proposes a graduated exemption model that 
better captures competing interests and considers elements like time and costs 
associated with allowing and restricting reuses of personal information. 
Specifically, instances of data philanthropy should be assessed through three use 
privileges: Exigencies, Responses, and Collective Knowledge. After fitting the 
requested reuse into the relevant category of use privileges, stakeholders should 
conduct a risk assessment and consider the potential privacy violations as well 
as the potential harm resulting from subjecting the reuse to privacy safeguards. 
The risk assessment should be contextualized through the prism of social norms 
and individuals’ privacy expectations in the particular instance. Helen 
Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity provides a useful decision-making 
heuristic for informing data philanthropy risk assessment in the three categories 
of use privileges. 269 The data philanthropy exception concludes by mandating 
that no data be retained beyond the time required to complete the socially 
beneficial reuse within the relevant use privilege category.  
1. Use Privileges Categories 
The data philanthropy exception does not provide a blanket authorization 
to eradicate privacy rights. Like the FIPs, this exception is designed to engage 
in the balancing of competing interests around personal information. Thus, a 
preliminary condition for the exception to apply is the existence of a conflict 
between an individual’s or a group’s privacy interest and the requested reuse. 
To qualify for one of these categories, privacy safeguards or privacy-related 
costs must hinder the beneficial use or otherwise make it less beneficial. Socially 
beneficial uses that can be completely fulfilled alongside privacy protections or 
privacy-related costs are beyond the scope of the data philanthropy exception: 
when privacy protections or costs have minimal or no impact on the use, the 
exception would not apply.  
Where socially beneficial uses face burdening costs or cannot fulfill their 
purpose when privacy safeguards are integrated, the potential reuse would enter 
the exception’s domain. Under the exception, a justification for reuse may be 
classified as one of three purposes: Exigencies, Responses, or Collective 
Knowledge. 
 
 267. See GDPR, supra note 260, at recital 33, 159.  
 268. Id. at recital 162. 
 269. Nissenbaum, supra note 23.  
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Exigencies: The law often facilitates the balancing of competing interests. 
In this task, exigencies occupy a singular place. When exigency materializes, the 
law acknowledges the urgency and allows a certain activity, which is usually 
subject to legal limits or requirements, to be completed in violation of these 
rules. For example, when an ambulance is on its way to an emergency scene, we 
do not expect it to obey speed limit rules. In fact, we want the ambulance to get 
there as fast as it can while accepting some increase in risk to other drivers, such 
as, when the ambulance runs a red light. These intuitions take concrete 
constitutional and statutory forms. The first is the Fourth Amendment, which 
offers two exceptions to its warrant requirements, both of which conceptualize 
some form of exigency.270 The second is the Disaster Relief 
and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974 (Stafford Act),271 under which—when 
emergencies are declared—provides a congressional grant of power, which is 
customarily reserved to Congress,272 to the president,273 and sets a legislative 
mechanism by which the president could suspend or override other laws to cope 
with a crisis.274 Many legal scholars have embraced emergency exceptionalism 
over the years.275 While the temporary degrading of rules has its limitations,276 
it is an indispensable part of any legal regime and human intuition.  
Following the same logic, it is normatively justified to remove some 
privacy protections that may hinder or retard the use of personal information in 
states of emergency. The exigency use privilege highlights a pressing need that 
is commonly linked to a shortage of time. Often, emergencies pose a risk that 
has either materialized or is about to happen and that can be prevented or 
mitigated, but only within a short time frame. For example, if, following a 
natural disaster, mobile data can help governments and emergency aids identify 
and quickly get to affected areas, demanding additional specific consent for the 
repurposing of the data could be impossible, immensely costly, or impractically 
time consuming. Even if anonymizing the data is practically feasible, but the 
personal information of mobile users could help in finding them and responding 
 
 270. For the exigent circumstances exception, see New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 n.3 (1984) (“We 
have long recognized an exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement in the Fourth Amendment 
context.”). For the emergency-aid exception, see Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 392 (1978) (“Numerous state 
and federal cases have recognized that the Fourth Amendment does not bar police officers from making 
warrantless entries and searches when they reasonably believe that a person within is in need of immediate aid.”).  
 271. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5121-5206 (2006). 
 272. U.S. Const. art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of 
Appropriations made by Law . . . .”). 
 273. 42 U.S.C. § 5122.  
 274. See id. § 5170.  
 275. Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Norms in a State of Permanent Emergency, 40 GA. L. REV. 699, 713–
15, 726–27, 747 (2006). For philosophical analysis of emergencies and the law, see Cass R. Sunstein, National 
Security, Liberty, and the D.C. Circuit, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 693, 693–94 (2005); Adrian Vermeule, Holmes 
on Emergencies, 61 STAN. L. REV. 163 (2008). 
 276. Justice Holmes’ account on emergencies acknowledges checks on governmental rights. See Vermeule, 
supra note 275, at 164–65.  
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better to their needs in emergencies, prioritizing privacy interests that could 
delay or prevent the use would be wrong.  
The exigency use privilege of data philanthropy represents the weakest 
form of privacy protection—the level of immediate risk justifies a higher degree 
of privacy invasion. Even though the exigency use privilege occupies one 
extreme on the spectrum of privileged uses, it does not grant a blanket 
authorization for data reuse in emergencies. Like the FIPs, the exigency use 
privilege requires balancing competing values and interests. At times, the 
privacy harms caused by data reuse in emergencies could generate a subsequent 
set of emergencies for individuals or groups at risk, such as by identifying 
individuals living in domestic violence shelters or participating in witness 
protection programs.  
Responses: The responses category of data philanthropy use privileges 
covers data reuse intended to generate insights in tackling a social problem or 
addressing a social need. In the response category, the need for the data is less 
urgent than it is under the exigencies category and usually includes responses to 
a social problem that are not limited by a critically short time frame. The risk 
assessment would thus require a greater social benefit to trump a privacy harm 
that could have been excused under the exigency use privilege. The universe of 
responses to social problems hosts a range of pressing issues. But the pressure 
to address a pressing issue does not necessarily match the critical pressure 
associated with exigencies. For example, using mobile data immediately after 
an earthquake to learn about population displacement for a more targeted 
humanitarian aid would qualify as an exigency, whereas using email data to 
identify suicidal teenagers would qualify as a response. In the former example, 
the use is required at a certain point of time, for a targeted short-lived effort, 
while in the latter, the use addresses an ongoing social problem. Responses may 
turn to exigencies if, for example, the analysis produces knowledge of an 
immediate risk. Similarly, exigencies may become responses, such as in the 
aftermath of a terror event when the immediate danger has subsided.  
Reuses under the response category would enjoy more flexible privacy-
protecting rules, without strict adherence to the purpose specification and use 
limitation principles. As the use moves away from the exigencies use privilege 
to the responses category, time constraints would be less relevant to justifying 
reuse without privacy safeguards. Instead, discussion would home in on other 
costs associated with maintaining or adding privacy protections as well as 
specific properties of the response that may require accessing and/or processing 
personally identifiable information. 
Collective Knowledge: The greatest promise of data philanthropy lies with 
breaking silos, and the most far-reaching effects of silo breaking are generated 
through research. Using datasets from private sector actors, researchers work to 
create new knowledge. Studies have used shared data in various disciplines and 
interest areas. In the wake of the Cambridge-Analytica scandal, in which an 
academic researcher took advantage of privileged access to Facebook user data, 
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researchers and private sector players have attempted to come up with ethical 
guidelines for data sharing for research. While these efforts could end up 
providing useful guidelines for researchers, most of them are currently offered 
on a high level of generality and are still at their infancy.277  
Unlike exigencies and responses, collective knowledge has a steadier and 
more continuous effect over time. It addresses a research question through a 
learning process that requires significant time to complete. The resulting work 
is usually published or otherwise shared with others in the relevant research 
community and turns into another building block of collective knowledge. While 
the production of collective knowledge does not lead to immediate real-life 
actions as with the other use privileges, the consequences of knowledge 
production are potentially more substantial and long-lasting. Under the 
exigencies use privilege, an action must be taken immediately, and the 
consequences of that choice will be analyzed ex-post when time is not of the 
essence. The response category allows for more deliberation prior to a 
responsive undertaking, dividing the learning process between ex-ante 
prediction and ex-post examination over time. The collective knowledge 
category allows for the most ex-ante deliberation prior to the implementation of 
any real-life pursuits. Consequently, the collective knowledge use privilege 
holds the greatest long-term promise, but also the greatest risk of being cemented 
as fact notwithstanding possible bias or resulting privacy harms. Also, while it 
is difficult to pinpoint the exact influence of a certain study on a certain strand 
of scholarship, research and human knowledge have always exhibited a 
cumulative nature.  
Because collective knowledge is rarely generated under pressure and 
enjoys the longest ex-ante learning process, this use privilege requires greater 
justifications for relaxing privacy safeguards. Unique research needs may 
represent a relevant justification under the collective knowledge use privilege of 
data philanthropy.278  
Data philanthropy privileged use categories are not clear-cut. To begin 
with, data-driven socially beneficial uses are rarely unambiguous—they can be 
motivated by an exigency, turned into a response, and over time, developed into 
collective knowledge. A reverse development may also materialize, as an 
existing research field has to respond to social problems that become 
 
 277. See, e.g., Guidelines for the Responsible Use of Social Media Data in Research, LANCASTER UNIV., 
http://wp.lancs.ac.uk/social-media-research-ethics/guidelines-for-the-responsible-use-of-social-media-data-in-
research/ (last visited July 27, 2019). Facebook’s initiative for election-related research is also an example. See, 
e.g., Gary King and Nathaniel Persily, A New Model for Industry-Academic Partnerships (Feb. 2, 2019) 
(unpublished manuscript), https://gking.harvard.edu/partnerships; Ian Lundberg et al., Privacy, Ethics, and Data 
Access: A Case Study of the Fragile Families Challenge (Sept. 1, 2018) (unpublished manuscript), 
https://arxiv.org/pdf/1809.00103.pdf; Molly Jackman & Lauri Kanerva, Evolving the IRB: Building Robust 
Review for Industry Research, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE, 442 (2016); Elliot Schrage & David Ginsberg, 
Facebook Launches New Initiative to Help Scholars Assess Social Media’s Impact on Elections, FACEBOOK 
NEWSROOM (Apr. 9, 2018), https://newsroom.fb.com/news/2018/04/new-elections-initiative/. 
 278. See, e.g., de Montjoye, supra note 192, at 6 (“We also considered cases where specific individuals 
could be contacted based on criteria applied to the data.”). 
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increasingly urgent, even up to the point of facilitating crucial immediate relief. 
Following the flexible, general quality of the FIPs, these use categories would 
sometimes overlap. The data philanthropy exception balances privacy 
safeguards with data philanthropy needs but leaves room for stakeholders to 
exercise significant discretion. Over time, as data philanthropy becomes more 
widespread, this discretionary power will be subject to additional evolving 
standards and lessons learned from previous instances of data philanthropy. 
2. Risk Assessment 
After matching a certain use with one of the use privileges, the data 
philanthropy exception moves to mandate a risk assessment. The risk assessment 
essentially looks at harms and benefits in the context of the specific use. The 
assessment does not entail quantitative comparison and requires nuanced 
consideration of different harms and benefits. In broad strokes, the risk 
assessment makes allowances for harms expected from data reuse including 
identification, perpetuation of bias, and the introduction of illegitimate 
discrimination or access barriers. The risk assessment also recognizes harms 
expected from barring data reuse in the specific context and the benefits 
expected from allowing such reuse.  
The risk assessment process highlights the privacy expectations of the data 
subjects by applying Nissenbaum’s contextual integrity decision heuristic.279 
The contextual integrity theory offers a framework for modeling intuitive 
judgments when information flows undergo radical changes.280 A practice 
would be deemed to violate contextual integrity when it transgresses context-
relative informational norms. Those norms are understood through four 
identifiers of the information flow: the relevant contexts;281 the actors, including 
the sender and receiver of the information and the information subject;282 the 
attributes, which refer to “the kind and degree of knowledge;”283 and the 
transmission principles that set the conditions under which information should 
transfer.284 When one of the identifiers of the information flow changes, the 
change is flagged as a prima facie breach of contextual integrity.285 Next, moral 
and political factors implicated by the changes in flow are considered, followed 
by an evaluation of these factors in the specific context, and concluding with a 
final judgment as to the compatibility of the information practice with contextual 
integrity principles.286  
Recognizing the four contextual integrity identifiers in the context of the 
original collection and the requested reuse would help stakeholders to better 
 
 279. NISSENBAUM, supra note 23, at 180–81. 
 280. Id. at 180. 
 281. Id. at 141. 
 282. Id. at 141–43. 
 283. Id. at 143–45. 
 284. Id. at 145–47. 
 285. NISSENBAUM, supra note 23, at 148–50. 
 286. Id. at 162–69. 
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understand the information flow and scrutinize the changes generated by data 
philanthropy. Because data philanthropy always involves repurposing collected 
data, it would always be considered a prima facie breach of contextual integrity. 
However, looking at broader moral principles that may underscore a need to 
address social issues, prevent looming harm, or manage a crisis, could end up 
justifying reuse from a data subject’s perspective and/or from a social 
perspective. Considering the specific norms within the relevant context would 
provide a clearer picture as to the expectations of data subjects and the 
conditions for a socially acceptable information flow.  
Admittedly, contextual integrity does not offer practical guidance on the 
assessment of risks in a given case. Identifying the benefits and risks of data 
reuse prior to the reuse is a hard task and there is no public consensus as to the 
relative weight of particular benefits and values.287 Furthermore, the line 
between different types of benefits and risks is an elusive one. For example, a 
single reuse can yield public and private benefits that are not mutually exclusive, 
and some reuses might be highly beneficial on the individual level but only 
moderately helpful to the public (and vice versa).288 It is also hard to identify all 
relevant stakeholders: should, for example, the interests of individuals who were 
not subjects of the data sets but who are nonetheless negatively affected by 
knowledge accrued from the use of consenting subjects’ data, be taken into 
consideration in the risk assessment?289  
These difficulties are yet another support to the path advocated for in this 
Article. Because the line drawing for data reuse for social good has not been 
successfully undertaken by policymakers, notwithstanding the increasing 
presence of data philanthropy, initial guidance must be offered to market 
participants. Contextual integrity is an excellent tool in this context, as it helps 
to think through an isolated case of data reuse from a broader policy perspective, 
map out the social expectations, and balance conflicting interests. 
In the course of assessing the risk through the prism of contextual integrity, 
assessors should also consider the type of information used and its level of 
sensitivity: from information that, if disclosed or accessed without proper 
authorization is unlikely to negatively impact data subjects or other affected 
parties, to information that, if disclosed or accessed without proper 
authorization, is likely to damage data subjects or affected parties, or frustrate 
efforts to address the relevant exigency or social problem.290  
When contextual integrity places a specific privacy risk within the realm 
of social expectations, a risk assessor is instructed to give that privacy risk less 
weight in the overall analysis. This is how, for example, stakeholders can 
 
 287. Fluitt, supra note 28, at 7–9. 
 288. Id.  
 289. Id. 
 290. This spectrum of data sensitivity is inspired by the United Nations Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs Data Responsibility Guidelines, which states that “a set of principles, processes and tools 
that support the safe, ethical and effective management of data in humanitarian response.” DATA RESPONSIBILITY 
GUIDELINES WORKING DRAFT, supra note 183.  
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account for the difference between data subjects who suffer privacy harm but 
are also the target of the social benefits of the data reuse, and individuals whose 
privacy is sacrificed for the sake of saving or helping others. In the first instance, 
individuals would be far more willing and expected to waive their privacy rights 
for the benefits they will accrue; whereas, in the second instance individuals may 
be more reluctant, especially if the privacy harm is significant. By evaluating 
values and morals in context, contextual integrity would also account for 
institutional trust mechanisms, such as the mandated review of an Institutional 
Review Board in the academic context, and flag them as risk-lowering factors 
in the assessment.  
3. Post-Reuse Retention  
After matching the scrutinized reuse with the appropriate use privilege and 
conducting a risk assessment, stakeholders would move to decide whether a 
socially beneficial reuse outside the scope of the initial collection purpose is 
allowed. However, even when a reuse is validated as qualifying for the data 
philanthropy exception, post-reuse retention would not be allowed beyond the 
time required to fulfill the purpose of the reuse. The retention time allowance 
usually correlates with the degree of privacy protection in the use privileges—
the higher the protection, the longer the retention. The data philanthropy 
exception would typically allow the shortest retention time for uses in the 
exigencies category: once the emergency subsides, the data is no longer useful 
in the exigencies domain and, unless the situation moved to the responses 
category, there is no justification for retaining the data outside the original scope 
of the reuse. If the use has moved to the responses category, more retention time 
is required until the social issue has been addressed or until attempts to address 
it through data philanthropy are halted. The longest retention time is commonly 
needed in the collective knowledge category, as knowledge production entails 
the longest time to complete. Additional reuses, such as those required for 
replication and validation studies following the first reuse, would have to be 
reviewed as independent reuses under the collective knowledge use privilege 
and would thus be granted their own retention time allowance. Even though 
collective knowledge enjoys the longest time retention, further attention should 
be given to retention and dissemination standards. In many cases, data used for 
research or scholarly articles are left unsecured and stored on open servers that 
could be accessed by anyone.291 This data can be easily reproduced, leaked 
outside the academic circles and potentially sold to third parties.292 Retention 
must adhere to acceptable cybersecurity and access standard within the 
researching institution.  
 
 291. Sheera Frenkel, Scholars Have Data on Millions of Facebook Users. Who’s Guarding It?, N.Y. TIMES 
(May 6, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/06/technology/facebook-information-data-sets-academics. 
html?smprod=nytcore-ipad&smid=nytcore-ipad-share.  
 292. Id. 
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CONCLUSION 
Socially beneficial uses of private sector data hold great promise. Since 
2011, when the data philanthropy discourse was informally launched, the 
practice has evolved, with new examples of private sector data sharing emerging 
every day. This Article traces the development of data philanthropy and 
introduces the growing conversation around data philanthropy in other research 
disciplines. Following a detailed description of data philanthropy, including 
existing sharing models, sharing incentives, and relevant stakeholders, this 
Article centers on what has been acknowledged as the most pressing legal 
challenge for data philanthropy: privacy risks. This Article recognizes that it is 
not privacy compliance and reidentification concerns that drive current demands 
for a privacy framework in data philanthropy discussions. Instead, privacy 
represents a broader set of informational concerns, as well as the need for general 
legal acknowledgement.  
As statutory legislation to regulate data philanthropy would be ineffective 
at this early stage, facing very low prospects of completion within a reasonable 
time and an inability to adapt quickly to technological and social changes, this 
Article proposes a data philanthropy exception to the Fair Information Practice 
Principles. Such exception would provide guidance to incumbent stakeholders 
and expose smaller players to the possibility of responsible data philanthropy. 
The proposed exception is structured as a graduated model of use privileges, 
ranging from exigencies, where privacy safeguards are the weakest, to responses 
to social problems, where protection increases, to generating collective 
knowledge, where the privileged use must comply with the highest level of 
privacy safeguards within the exception. The use categories reinforce a 
contextualized analysis of socially beneficial uses of data and are followed by a 
risk assessment that incorporates various interests and considers individual and 
social expectations. Correlating the time allowance for data retention with the 
time frame of the use privileges further guarantees an appropriate balance 
between the privacy interests of the data subjects and broader social benefits in 
data philanthropy.  
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